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cover various aspects of the Haitian 
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F R O M  T H E  E D I T O R
I
n August 1999, Jaim e Garzon, a popular political satirist, was gunned down on his way to 
the Bogota radio station where he worked. The m urder sparked an outpouring of 
protests and m ourning in Colombia and received extensive coverage in the international 
press. Regrettably, however, the m urder of a journalist is an all too common occurrence 
in much of Latin America. Scores of less famous reporters, photographers and editors in 
the region have lost their lives in the past decade as a direct result of their work, without 
receiving the same public attention.
This issue of Hemisphere focuses on journalism  in Latin America, in both its positive and nega­
tive aspects. In his article about anti-press violence in the region, Silvio Waisbord argues that such 
attacks are not isolated events, but rather the product of societies with legacies of hum an rights 
abuses and weak civil institutions. He uses the m urder of Argentine photojournalist Jose Luis 
Cabezas as a case in point. A nother journalist who died violently in Argentina, Rodolfo Walsh, is 
the subject of an article by Jose Luis Benavides. The article celebrates the lifework of a m an rec­
ognized as a pioneer in the movement toward socially responsible journalism . Chappell Lawson 
also emphasizes a lessening of state control over the m edia in his article about the growth of inde­
pendent journalism in Mexico. Finally, Laurie Goering, a reporter with The Chicago Tribune, 
shares her (often hum orous) experiences working as a correspondent in Brazil.
O ther topics covered in this issue include the ongoing legal proceedings against General 
Augusto Pinochet. Gregory Weeks provides a summary of the case and its implications for 
Chilean politics, as well as o ther dictators past and present. Two articles look at trade relations 
between the countries of the Western Hemisphere and Europe, a timely issue given the recent 
protests against globalization in many parts of the world. Janet C hernela’s piece on the changing 
economic landscape of Manaus ties into this them e by studying the shifting role of the 
Amazonian rainforest in the global economy.
A double book review by Kathleen M artin focuses on Rigoberta Menchu, the Nobel Prize- 
winning indigenous activist who found herself at the center of controversy last year. Martin 
reviews M enchu’s own book as well as a critical account of her story by anthropologist David Stoll.
Finally, the photo essay in this issue features a series of poignant images from the m ining towns 
of Bolivia, many of which were virtually abandoned after a 1985 decree closed the state-owned tin 
mines. The pictures return  to the them e of globalization and the impact streamlined economic 
policies can have on specific industries and populations. Yet, they also reveal the tenacity of the 
displaced mine workers and the birth of private enterprises in many towns.
As always, we welcome your comments about Hemisphere and look forward to bringing you our 
next issue, whose focus will be racial and ethnic identity in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Eduardo A. Gamarra
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Stranger Than Fiction
Laurie Goering
ften, it seems, cover­
ing Brazil comes 
down to a test of sta­
mina. Take the forest 
fires that roared 
through Brazil’s 
northern Roraima state last year, 
blackening rainforest and parts of the 
country’s main Yanomami Indian 
reserve.
For the better part of a week I and 
other journalists made forays into the 
fire zone by rental car and small 
plane on the days when the smoke 
wasn’t too thick. We interviewed fire­
fighters, local victims and Indian 
agency officials. We scorched our 
shoes and drank warm soft drinks in 
the stifling heat.
Finally, it came time to leave for 
other stories. The problem was, we 
couldn’t.
Thick smoke that made a joke of 
the capital’s name—Boa Vista, or 
“Good View”—had downed all flights 
for days. With each cancellation, the 
lines at the airport grew.
Finally, desperate, several of us 
climbed aboard the only transporta­
tion out of town, a bus to Manaus 
arranged by the airlines. Only 13 
hours, on “mosdy” paved roads, the 
ticketing agent promised. Once 
there, we’d have priority status for 
flights out of the Amazon.
We got the last seats on the bus, 
next to the toilet, which quit function­
ing less than an hour into the “flight.” 
During frequent rest stops the driver 
lurched back to visit with us, whiskey 
botde in hand. At river crossings, fer­
ries failed to appear. A live sex act 
took place in the seat in front of us.
Laurie Goering is the South America 
correspondent for The Chicago Tribune.
Writing about Brazil—and the rest of Latin America—has its 
oivn set of pitfalls, and in four years of living in Brazil I’ve found 
most of them.
Finally, 14 hours later and with 
m idnight approaching, we pulled 
into Manaus, covered head to toe in 
thick red dust.
“Let me guess,” joked the airline 
agent at the counter. “Boa Vista?”
Writing about Brazil—and the rest 
of Latin America—has its own set of 
pitfalls, and in four years of living in 
Brazil I ’ve found most of them.
This country, for instance, does 
not have the kind of comprehensive 
open records laws journalists rou­
tinely depend on in the United 
States. Getting government docu­
ments is mostly a test of patience 
and charm, not a m atter of submit­
ting Freedom of Information Act 
requests.
I once tried to get a set of proper­
ty records at a government office in 
the northeastern city of Fortaleza, as 
part of an investigative series. I was 
met with suspicion by the woman 
behind the counter.
O f course I couldn’t see the docu­
ments—not that she had them  any­
way, she said. Why did I need them? 
What was my motive? The fact that I 
was a journalist wasn’t good enough.
For a few hours I sat with her and 
chatted about her job, her kids, my 
job, Chicago, the weather and the 
latest soccer results. She served me 
a bowl of hom em ade candied 
cashew fruit.
Eventually, after a bit of looking, 
she found the records and let me 
see them. She h adn’t given them  to 
me, she emphasized, and I couldn’t
photocopy them or record them in 
any other way.
We chatted a while longer, as I 
glanced nonchalantly through the 
documents. In time, she decided 
that perhaps I could copy them after 
all, just as long as I promised never 
to use her name in connection with 
my story. I did, and we both left sat­
isfied.
Encounters with Brazil’s notorious 
bureaucracy don’t always go so 
smoothly. Last year, it took me near­
ly a year to renew my working visa, 
including a standoff with a clerk who 
opined that my letter of application 
wasn’t detailed enough and insisted 
my visa wasn’t ready, eight months 
after it had been granted. Along the 
way the customs authority threatened 
to deport my furniture and my cat.
Eventually I got the visa—one day 
after Veja, Brazil’s leading news­
magazine, ran a story about my 
plight. ‘You’re famous,” said the 
chief of the visa section, when I 
walked into the office. He gave me a 
big hug and the desk clerk gave me 
my visa—after insisting that I make a 
new photocopy of a key document, 
as the current one was 23% too 
large.
Magical realism is alive and well in 
Brazil. Sometimes the smaller issues 
of journalism  in Latin America, how­
ever, are just as thorny. Take the 
term “Latin America” itself.
Brazilians, of Portuguese rather than 
Spanish heritage, take offense some­
times at being term ed part of “Latin”
4 Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two
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Covering the news in Brazil
America. The problem is, there is no 
other easy way to describe the 
region. Calling something an issue 
in “Latin America and Brazil” is awk­
ward and confusing for readers, par­
ticularly when journalists don’t have 
room repeatedly to explain Brazil’s 
rather different history to an audi­
ence that still thinks that Spanish is 
the only language spoken between 
the Rio Grande and Antarctica.
Describing Indians is for me anoth­
er vexing problem. Newspapers in 
the United States try to use the politi­
cally correct term “native Americans” 
when possible to describe Indians in 
this country. What then to call 
Brazil’s natives? Surely they too are 
native Americans, but how do I stop 
readers from picturing the Sioux in 
Amazonia? I still haven’t come up 
with a good alternative, despite 
hours of pondering.
As a non-speaker of Portuguese 
when I arrived in Brazil, I ’ve had my 
moments with the language as well.
I once referred to a source—let’s call 
him Joao Oliveira Neto—as Mr. Neto 
in second reference. Neto actually 
means “the third.” 1 also early in my 
tenure narrowly avoided translating 
the Zona de Mata, near the coast of 
Pernambuco state, as the Zone of 
Death. It is, of course, the Forest 
Zone.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty fac­
ing a correspondent in Latin 
America, however, is simply making 
stories from the region interesting to 
the readers back home.
I admit that before I moved to Rio 
de Janeiro, I rarely read a story from 
the region, except for tales from the 
Amazon, and I had to look at a map 
to find Rio. I try to keep that in 
mind as I write for others, many of 
whom share my shortcomings.
What is increasingly clear to me is 
that when American journalists here 
focus on writing straightforward 
news stories, about elections in 
Venezuela or lack of funding for 
environmental protection in Brazil, 
not many readers come along for the 
ride.
When we spin tales, however, we 
pull in readers who wouldn’t other­
wise pay attention. Who could put 
down a story, for instance, not about 
Venezuela’s elections but about a 
charismatic former coup leader who 
thinks himself part Jesus Christ and 
part Simon Bolivar and rises to 
power democratically, quoting Walt 
Whitman in his inauguration speech?
O r how about the Roman Catholic 
priest/pop star who was voted 
Brazil’s sexiest man—and just hap­
pens to be leading one of the most 
successful revivals of the Roman 
Catholic Church in the region?
Magic realism is alive and well in 
Latin America, and it is these kinds 
of tales that bring the region to life 
for readers who otherwise have little 
interest in this part of the world.
Brazil’s recent economic crisis has 
pointed to another potential pitfall 
of reporting here—journalists’ ability 
to influence, as well as simply cover, 
the news.
With investors scrutinizing Brazil, a 
foreign news agency in Rio de 
Janeiro released a photo showing 
Brazilians jam m ed in long lines out­
side the banks. In Brazil, everyone 
knows that such lines are normal, 
but in the United States the photo 
was taken as evidence of a run  on the 
banks—and nearly produced one 
here as worried foreign investors 
fled, the currency plunged and 
depositors ran to switch their savings 
into dollars.
The Brazilian media in turn 
prom pted their own run on the 
banks by repeating rumors—in large 
front-page headlines—that President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso was 
planning to freeze bank accounts, 
despite his vehement denials. 
Accounts were never frozen, and cus­
tomers trooped back to redeposit 
their money when the scare was over.
I’ve seen intentional media abuses 
as well. I once visited a group of 
Guarani Indians who had seized what 
they considered ancestral land from 
a local farmer. A Brazilian television 
news program a few days earlier had 
shown one of the Guarani holding a 
gun to the television reporter’s head.
I asked the Indians why they’d 
threatened the reporter. “Oh, he 
begged us to do that. He said it 
would make good television,” one of 
the Indian leaders said. I winced for 
my profession.
I myself, however, have also been 
accused of plotting. While covering 
the fires near Boa Vista, I and other 
foreign reporters happened to see a 
news analysis segment by a religious 
commentator on local television.
Amazonia, he squawked with indig­
nation, was the victim of a plot.
Spies and foreign operatives, posing 
as foreign journalists, were rushing 
to town not to write about the blaz­
ing fires but to try to lay the ground­
work for a foreign takeover of the 
Amazon, he said.
By suggesting Brazil is incapable of 
caring for the world's largest rainfor­
est, he continued, the spies were cre­
ating the justification for an invasion.
Those of us gathered around the 
television looked at each other in 
amazement. An international plot? 
We hadn’t even been able to orga­
nize a flight out of Boa Vista yet. ■
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Autumn of the General
Gregory Weeks
A
lthough General 
Augusto Pinochet 
handed power back 
to civilians in 1990 
after nearly 17 years 
of dictatorship, he 
remains a polarizing force in Chile. 
His continued presence as com m an­
der in chief of the army proved 
problematic for establishing civilian 
supremacy over the arm ed forces. 
Once he retired from the army in 
March 1998, he was entitled under 
the military-penned 1980 constitu­
tion to become a senator for life, 
thus ensuring his active presence in 
politics until his death. When 
Pinochet was arrested in London on 
October 16, 1998 on the orders of 
Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon, the 
Chilean governm ent was dealing 
not with an aged and discredited 
dictator, but a senator who contin­
ued to com m and considerable sup­
port from the Chilean right.
D o m e st ic  P o l it ic s
Pinochet’s case presented the 
adm inistration of then President 
Eduardo Frei with a difficult situa­
tion. Frei is a Christian Democrat 
(as was his predecessor, Patricio 
Aylwin) but part of the ruling party 
coalition known as the 
Concertacion, which includes the 
Socialist Party and the Party for 
Democracy. Both are left-leaning 
parties that have clamored for more 
active efforts to bring to trial those 
military officers who committed 
hum an rights abuses under the mili­
tary regime. The coalition was
Gregory Weeks is a lecturer in the 
Department of Political Science at San 
Diego State University.
already showing signs of strain; the 
Pinochet arrest made unity even 
m ore problem atic and complicated 
Frei’s policy choices.
Supporting the arrest would 
antagonize the military, and espe­
cially the army. Pinochet is revered 
within its ranks, and the new com­
m ander in chief, General Ricardo 
Izurieta, would have been forced to 
react. Throughout the 1990s, the 
army resorted to shows of force, 
veiled threats and intense media 
campaigns to protest government 
policies it believed were contrary to 
its interests. Consequently, the 
threat of a new crisis was very real.
It would necessarily politicize 
Izurieta, whom the governm ent 
considers a more “professional” offi­
cer and who refrained from the 
constant political pronouncem ents 
that characterized Pinochet. 
However, Izurieta also faced consid­
erable pressure from the officer 
corps to retain a hard line and to 
protect the com m ander in chief 
benemento, a title granted Pinochet 
before he retired that has no legal 
basis o ther than to dem onstrate his 
elevated status.
The army did no t hesitate to 
make its concerns known to the 
government. The day after the 
arrest, it issued a statem ent express­
ing its "perm anent support and soli­
darity" with Pinochet. Izurieta met 
several times with the commanders 
in chief of the o ther branches of 
the military, and all watched the 
governm ent closely. There was little 
immediate reason for complaint: 
President Frei, form er President 
Aylwin, Foreign Minister Jose 
Miguel Insulza and the Archbishop 
of Santiago consistently dem anded 
Pinochet’s release. Genaro
Arriagada, a prom inent Christian 
Democrat, wrote in an editorial that 
a "peaceful transition from dictator­
ship to democracy is not a judicial 
problem. Rather, politics must dis­
criminate am ong the differing and 
sometimes antagonistic objectives 
that society demands." Even Raul 
Rettig, the form er head of a com­
mission that investigated and pub­
lished the details of hum an rights 
abuses, stated that the issue should 
be left to Chile to resolve. In other 
words, foreign judicial proceedings 
would upset the delicate political 
balance so carefully constructed 
since 1990.
The government was also acutely 
aware that popular support for 
Pinochet was far from negligible. 
Polls dem onstrated that nearly 40% 
of the population considered them ­
selves Pinochet supporters, while 
31% opposed him and 29% either 
d idn’t know or d idn’t respond. 
Despite the fact that a significant 
minority of Chileans opposed the 
arrest, however, the C oncertacion’s 
leftist parties criticized Frei’s stance, 
stretching the integrity of the coali­
tion to its limits. Yet, while fissures 
had always been evident, rum ors of 
the Concertacion’s death were 
greatly exaggerated.
T h e  In t e r n a t io n a l  R e a c t io n
Overshadowing the implications 
of the Pinochet case for Chile’s 
domestic politics is the internation­
al prerogative to punish dictators 
who grossly violate the hum an 
rights of their citizens.
International law proved amenable 
and Garzon was active in utilizing it. 
Aside from Pinochet, Garzon target­
ed 37 other form er government 
officials and military officers, whom
6 Heinisphene • Volume Nhie, Number Two
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Pinochet and the search for justice in Chile
Pinochet’s case highlights the long-term problems of dealing with 
the past, in Latin America and elsewhere.
the Chilean government advised 
not to leave the country. Garzon 
also gained the largely symbolic sup­
port of the European Parliament, 
which issued a declaration congrat­
ulating both Spain and Great 
Britain for detaining Pinochet.
Garzon argued that the 1948 
Geneva Conventions allow any 
country to try cases involving seri­
ous crimes against hum an rights, 
regardless of where they took place. 
In addition, he pointed out that in 
1985 the United Nations expanded 
its definition of genocide to include 
exterm ination of political oppo­
nents. U nder Spanish law, further­
more, Spanish courts are justified in 
proceeding with cases involving 
genocide. Garzon had already 
gained notoriety by bringing 
charges against 110 Argentine mili­
tary and police officers accused of 
the most serious violations against 
Spanish citizens during the period 
of military rule in Argentina. These 
cases led him to investigate 
"Operation Condor," in which the 
Chilean governm ent illegally coor­
dinated swaps of political prisoners 
with o ther South American military 
regimes. The culmination of these 
investigations was his effort to seek 
Pinochet’s detention for genocide 
against victims of any nationality, 
not only Spaniards.
Garzon’s case had been proceed­
ing for m onths before Pinochet was 
arrested, and the Chilean govern­
m ent made clear that it did no t rec­
ognize the legitimacy of Spanish
courts to prosecute Chileans. Even 
Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria 
Aznar stated publicly that he disap­
proved but could do nothing. 
Debate ensued as to whether 
Pinochet’s arrest was legal. As a 
senator, he was traveling on a diplo­
matic passport, and the Chilean 
governm ent argued that he was on 
an official mission to discuss possi­
ble arms sales. Nevertheless, the 
1961 Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations does not grant 
immunity from prosecution unless 
the diplomat is formally accredited 
with the host country. No interna­
tional law or convention prohibits 
prosecution of visiting heads of 
state, weakening even further claims 
of immunity by a form er head of 
state.
Since World War II, many states— 
particularly in Western Europe— 
have codified into national law the 
ability to try universal crimes against 
humanity. In the 1990s, both 
Rwandans and Serbs were prosecut­
ed (and even jailed) for violating 
these laws. P inochet’s case is differ­
ent. Despite the glaring and brutal 
violations of hum an rights during 
his regime, Pinochet continues to 
enjoy domestic and international 
support, and he is a senator.
Form er British Prime Minister 
M argaret T hatcher published a let­
ter stating that Pinochet "was a 
good friend to this country during 
the Falklands War. By his actions 
the war was shortened and many 
British lives were saved." Calls for
his release came also from form er 
US president George Bush, H enry 
Kissinger, Jessie Helms, and even 
the Vatican. With influential allies, 
Pinochet was in a m uch better posi­
tion to resist prosecution.
Skeptics also began to worry 
about the power of national courts. 
As a result of Garzon’s efforts, 
judges and citizens in eight o ther 
European countries initiated indict­
ments against Pinochet. If he could 
be arrested, then did not every 
national leader potentially face the 
same threat? President Frei asked 
rhetorically w hether a Chilean court 
could then initiate proceedings for 
crimes com m itted under the 
Spanish dictatorship of Francisco 
Franco. Around the world, critics 
warned of a dangerous precedent 
that would engender frivolous 
attempts at prosecution, while sup­
porters clamored for prosecution of 
dictators and their followers. By 
January 1999, Portuguese lawyers 
had announced plans to seek the 
extradition of form er Indonesian 
president Suharto for the killings he 
ordered in East Timor, a Portuguese 
colony forcibly annexed by 
Indonesia in 1976. P inochet’s fate 
will represent an im portant prece­
dent for these and similar cases.
B r it a in ’s D ilem m a
Once the decision regarding 
extradition was in British hands, the 
issue was far m ore political than 
juridical. On October 30, 1998, the 
English High Court ruled that 
Pinochet should never have been 
arrested, since he was head of state 
when the crimes were committed 
and therefore entitled to immunity. 
Lawyers for the Spanish govern­
m ent appealed, and the case was
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Reports: Chile
referred to a five-member panel 
from the House of Lords. In the 
meantime, Hom e Secretary Jack 
Straw, England’s top cabinet-level 
judicial authority, had the authority 
to order P inochet’s release. He was 
lobbied intensely to do so by 
Pinochet supporters, who flew en 
masse to England to secure the gen­
eral’s freedom. Straw could have 
cited hum anitarian reasons based 
on P inochet’s ill health, but the 
irony was obvious; as many noted, 
hum anitarian pardons were not 
issued to the thousands of people 
tortured  and killed under 
P inochet’s direction.
From the perspective of hum an 
rights activists and Chileans adverse­
ly affected by Pinochet’s rule 
(including many members of the 
governm ent and Congress who were 
exiled, beaten a n d /o r  had relatives 
killed), the Spanish initiative repre­
sented the most promising way to 
judge Pinochet. In 1978, the mili­
tary regime proclaimed an amnesty 
that granted a blanket pardon for 
1973-1978, the period when the 
bulk of the abuses occurred. 
Pinochet argued that the country 
had been in a state of war, and that 
any "excesses" should be viewed in 
this light. Although the democratic 
governments of the post-1990 peri­
od did prosecute a few officers, 
including form er intelligence chief 
Manuel Contreras, these successes 
came only after significant conces­
sions to the army.
The only rem aining way to judge 
Pinochet was to enact a constitu­
tional measure accusing him of vio­
lating the nation’s honor. A group 
of Christian Democrats forced this 
measure to a vote in early 1998, 
when Pinochet retired from the 
army and entered  the Senate. They 
were defeated by a com bination of 
military pressure and exhortations 
from both current and form er gov­
ernm ent officials, including 
President Aylwin. These officials 
argued that the proposal ran
counter to the decision to avoid 
antagonizing Pinochet in favor of 
dem ocratic stability, and that it 
would complicate government-army 
relations ju st as Izurieta took con­
trol. Thus, although twelve sepa­
rate cases against P inochet have 
been launched in Chile, the 
amnesty law and his senatorial 
immunity almost certainly doom  
them  to failure.
Straw took no action, and both in 
Chile and abroad there was consen­
sus that the House of Lords would 
not overturn the High C ourt’s deci­
sion. But on November 15, 1998 
(P inochet’s eighty-third birthday), 
the panel voted 3-2 to deny im mu­
nity, ensuring that the general 
would rem ain in custody. In 
December, Straw decided that the 
extradition process should begin, 
opening the way to m onths of hear­
ings, deliberations and appeals.
The Chilean army and navy 
issued official declarations in 
protest. Both asserted that the mili­
tary governm ent had been Chile’s 
savior in a time of national crisis. 
The army went further, com plain­
ing that the Chilean governm ent’s 
efforts to release Pinochet had 
been inadequate. P inochet himself 
sent a letter addressed to all 
Chileans in which he defended the 
1973 coup and claimed that the 
army had acted to save the "funda­
m ental values of our civilization" 
from communism. Subsequently, 
everything he did was rooted in 
"thinking of the liberty of Chileans, 
their well-being and national unity." 
He went on to assert that he was 
the "object of a political-juridical 
machination, crafty and cowardly, 
which has no moral value."
Meanwhile, P inochet’s lawyers 
succeeded in overturning the 
House of Lords’ decision by noting 
a conflict of interest regarding one 
of the panel’s members, who had 
close ties to Amnesty International. 
A new panel was charged to begin 
deliberations all over again. On
March 24, 1999, the Law Lords 
ru led  that Pinochet was not 
im mune, but could no t be tried for 
crimes com m itted before December 
1998, when Britain signed the 
International Convention on 
Torture. U nder these terms, only 
three of the original 32 charges still 
stood. The Law Lords also asked 
Straw to decide w hether or not 
P inochet could face extradition.
O n April 15, Straw decided affirma­
tively, thus ensuring that the case 
would continue for months.
F u t u r e  I m p l ic a t io n s
In many ways, the Pinochet case 
helped define Chile’s last presiden­
tial election, in Decem ber 1999.
The two parties on the Chilean 
right (the conservative 
Independent Democratic Union 
and the m oderate National 
Renovation), often at odds, united 
behind dem ands to bring Pinochet 
back to Chile. They even called on 
Frei to expel the Socialist Party 
from the government, blaming it 
for failing to secure P inochet’s 
release. Despite this campaign, 
their candidate, Joaqum  Lavfn 
(UDI), a conservative mayor of an 
affluent Santiago suburb, lost to the 
Concertacion’s Ricardo Lagos in a 
runoff vote in January  2000. Lagos, 
a well-known politician and form er 
Socialist cabinet member, ran a 
campaign that highlighted the left’s 
concerns but largely avoided the 
Pinochet issue.
P inochet’s arrest convulsed 
Chilean politics, underlining the 
dilemma of pursuing justice in diffi­
cult political contexts. There is no 
threat of a coup d ’etat in Chile, but 
the governm ent must address a 
politically active military that has 
exerted considerable and consistent 
influence even after the transition 
to democracy. Regardless of the 
final outcome, P inochet’s case has 
highlighted the long-term problems 
of dealing with the past, in Latin 
America and elsewhere. ■
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Reports: Caribbean
Toward a New Partnership?
Paul Sutton
Poverty and paradise do not coexist easily in the minds of most 
Europeans; insofar as paradise has the edge over poverty in 
popular perception, the Caribbean will suffer.I
n international relations, all 
is change and uncertainty. 
Yet, longstanding relations 
between countries and estab­
lished ways of conducting 
international affairs bring a 
measure of stability and predictabil­
ity. O ne of the m ore enduring of 
these relationships is that between 
Europe and the Caribbean, which 
m arked its half m illennium  in 1992. 
In the last 500 years, Europe has 
left deep legacies in the region, 
both tangible and intangible, good 
and bad. To this day, the bound­
aries of the European U nion (EU), 
represented by the French 
Departem ents d ’Outre-Mer, the 
N etherlands Antilles and the British 
D ependent Territories (newly 
renam ed Overseas T erritories), 
extend to the Caribbean. Since 
1975, the cornerstone of this rela­
tionship has been the Lome 
Convention.
The Lome Convention is the sin­
gle most im portant framework for 
bringing the largest num ber of 
underdeveloped countries (the 71 
countries of Africa, the Caribbean 
and the Pacific, collectively known 
as the ACP) into a close ‘develop­
m en t’ relationship with the largest 
bloc of developed countries (the 15 
m em ber states of the EU). The 
original convention was signed in 
1975 and renegotiated in 1980,
1985 and 1990; in its cu rren t form, 
it runs until February 29, 2000. 
Negotiations to determ ine its future 
shape began in Septem ber 1998.
At stake is the nature of the contin-
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ued European presence in the 
Caribbean, and in particular, the 
EU’s role in such areas as hum an 
rights, economic developm ent and 
trade.
T h e  E u r o p e a n  U n io n  a s  F o r e ig n  
P o l ic y  A c t o r
For the EU, the Lome 
Convention is but one of several 
frameworks for dealing with the 
developing world. Recently, the EU 
has upgraded its interests in Latin 
America, especially the Mercosur 
countries, and in Asia. In engaging 
with these areas, the EU is seeking 
commercial and political advantage, 
with only passing reference to the 
provision of developm ent assis­
tance. This is consistent with a 
greater emphasis in EU external 
relations on political issues and a 
heightened vocation by many in the 
European Commission, the EU’s 
executive body, to provide the EU 
with the power to exercise political 
leadership in global affairs.
The political dimension is a core 
feature of the Commission’s pro­
posals for a new Lome Convention. 
This is perhaps most clearly stated 
in the pream ble to the Draft 
Negotiating M andate the 
Commission released in January  
1998. This docum ent states that 
the convention will contain “an 
essential elem ents clause” confirm ­
ing that the policies of all parties to 
the convention are “inform ed by 
respect for hum an rights, dem ocrat­
ic principles and the rule of law, 
and good governance.”
This wording has touched a raw 
nerve with some in the ACP. The 
Caribbean especially is sensitive to 
perceived infringem ents of its sov­
ereignty, bu t in this case, the critics 
may be overreacting. The EU pro­
posals are part of a general move­
m ent toward greater conditionality 
in the provision of developm ent 
assistance, a process driven by the 
Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Developm ent’s 
m ajor aid donors. They also find 
support am ong the European pub­
lic, particularly the m ajor non­
governmental developm ent organi­
zations (NGDOs). The proposals 
are being presented as part of an 
established process of political dia­
logue that the Libreville 
Declaration, which outlines the 
principles governing the ACP’s 
approach to the Lome negotiations, 
agreed had value.
The Commonwealth Caribbean 
has nothing to fear from political 
dialogue, and m uch to gain if it can 
add its particular concerns to those 
of the EU. O ne obvious considera­
tion is coherence between the in ter­
nal policies of the EU and their 
external effects. A nother is rela­
tions with third parties which 
adversely affect ACP interests (such 
as the curren t conflict with the 
U nited States over the EU banana 
regim e). O ther concerns, as listed 
in the ACP negotiating mandate,
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include treatm ent of ACP immi­
grants in the EU, extraeconom ic 
activities of transnational compa­
nies, transboundary movement and 
disposal of hazardous waste, drug 
trafficking and money laundering. 
The EU proposals should therefore 
not be resisted as a m atter of princi­
ple, but rather reworked to provide 
a genuine forum  for regular 
exchanges of views with the goal of 
improved cooperation and a more 
equal partnership.
The Commission also proposes a 
greater engagem ent with civil soci­
ety. The Caribbean can make its 
presence felt in this area, drawing 
on the well-established democratic 
tradition in the majority of its states 
and the wide range of interest 
groups active in various national 
debates. These need to be har­
nessed if there is to be a genuine 
political dialogue about Lome. The 
parties involved must also reevalu­
ate how such a forum  should be 
structured. To date, governments, 
the private sector and NGDOs have 
held separate discussions, a selec­
tive pursuit of interest that leaves 
the Caribbean open to the strate­
gies of divide and rule it claims the 
m etropolitan powers practice in the 
region.
D e v e l o p m e n t  C o o p e r a t io n
In discussing the future of Lome, 
it is im portant to realize what is at 
stake in developm ent assistance 
alone (separating it for the m om ent 
from trade, which in the past has 
been the o ther core elem ent of the 
Lome package). In the period 
1975-1995, the EU’s own develop­
m ent program  (as distinguished 
from that of individual EU states) 
earm arked approximately $2.08 bil­
lion dollars for the independent 
states and dependent territories of 
the Caribbean. Proportionately, as 
a region of mostly small states, the 
Caribbean did well on a per capita 
basis within the ACP grouping and 
even better in relation to o ther 
developing countries. In some 
parts of the Caribbean, and espe­
cially am ong the smaller states of 
the Eastern Caribbean, such aid has 
been especially significant.
The key question for the 
Caribbean is, how m uch of this aid 
is at risk in a successor convention? 
The answer is no t easy to deter­
mine; it depends to a considerable 
extent on a m uch wider debate on 
the purpose and priorities of devel­
opm ent assistance. However, the 
omens are not good for the more 
developed, high-income countries 
of the region. The EU, along with 
o ther m ajor donors, has deter­
m ined that developm ent assistance 
should target the poorest countries. 
In the Caribbean, Haiti and Guyana 
undoubtedly qualify, bu t the 
Bahamas, Barbados, and most likely 
Trinidad and Tobago do not. The 
other states are somewhere in 
between. Political and procedural 
considerations undoubtedly play a 
role in such assessments, bu t there 
is also a moral dim ension to the 
perception of lesser need in the 
Caribbean which is linked to the 
popular image of the region as an 
idyllic holiday destination. Poverty 
and paradise do not coexist easily 
in the minds of most Europeans; 
insofar as paradise has the edge 
over poverty in popular perception, 
the Caribbean will suffer.
In any successor arrangem ent to 
Lome, the Caribbean will have to 
dem onstrate objective need.
C urrent thinking has advanced the 
idea of vulnerability as the key to 
the special needs of the region’s 
smaller states. Small states, it is 
argued, are m ore vulnerable than 
larger ones to economic shocks, 
environm ental risks and security 
threats. In particular, small devel­
oping states (those with a popula­
tion of 1.5 million or less) exhibit 
greater volatility of ou tput com­
pared to large states as a conse­
quence of greater exposure to 
external economic forces and envi­
ronm ental hazards. W hen these 
factors are taken into account and 
quantified in a composite vulnera­
bility index, 20 small ACP states out 
of a sample of 100 developing states 
are categorized as most vulnerable. 
O f these, seven are in the 
Caribbean.
The idea of a vulnerability index 
has yet to win general recognition. 
The figures cited above are from a 
study commissioned by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, which 
has prom oted the use of such an 
index. Its value to the Caribbean 
and o ther small developing coun­
tries, most of which are defined as 
middle-income states, is to provide 
a case for special consideration in 
accessing official developm ent assis­
tance. The Commission appears 
sympathetic to such arguments; its 
Draft Negotiating M andate m en­
tions that special provision will be 
m ade for vulnerable states, includ­
ing landlocked and island coun­
tries. It also proposes that the over­
all figure for program m able 
resources (those directed to specific 
countries and regions) "will be cal­
culated in the light of a country’s 
estimated needs—size, population, 
income, vulnerability, geographical
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situation—and an assessment of its 
merits based on perform ance and 
sound management." If these are 
indeed the criteria, then many states 
in the Caribbean will be able to 
meet them  in full.
T r ad e
The same cannot be said for trade. 
This has always been a contentious 
area in ACP-EU relations and the 
most im portant elem ent of the 
Lome Convention for the 
Caribbean. The Commission’s cur­
ren t proposals have run into opposi­
tion from all sides. Both the British 
government and the International 
Development Committee of the 
House of Commons, which released 
a detailed report on renegotiation of 
the Lome Convention in May 1998, 
believe they will be unworkable in 
their present form. The ACP shares 
their concern, as do virtually all 
major NGDOs in Europe.
As far as the Caribbean is con­
cerned, there are two major issues: 
whether the region will benefit from 
a Free Trade Area (FTA) with the 
EU, and what will happen to existing 
trade protocols. With respect to 
trade frameworks, the Commission 
spells out three options:
• The status quo for least developed 
countries (LDCs) that can continue 
to benefit from current Lome pref­
erences. In the Caribbean, this 
option applies only to Haiti.
• Adapting non-LDCs to the EU’s 
general system of preferences 
(GSP). This option is open to all 
Caribbean states; however, prelimi­
nary research suggests that it implies 
considerable loss of benefits, with 
the Caribbean seriously affected as a 
group.
• The negotiation of an FTA with 
the EU by 2005. The Commission 
believes that the Caribbean will 
choose this option, since it possesses 
the greatest cohesion and the most
advanced regional organization 
am ong the ACP states. A major 
Caribbean concern is that such an 
agreem ent could divert rather than 
create trade.
Which option is best for the 
Caribbean? Anthony Gonzales of 
Trinidad’s Institute of International 
Relations has studied this question 
in depth and reached the conclu­
sion that "an FTA would appear in 
the long term  to be a superior 
instrum ent to most favoured nation, 
GSP and Lome. It would expand 
market size by providing better 
access to FTA preferences as well as 
offer greater security of market 
access, transparency and stable rules. 
It could better focus the attention of 
the region on dynamic gains by 
examining other trade barriers, pro­
tective rules of origin and restrictive 
investment provisions that im pede a 
better flow of efficiency-seeking 
investment to areas where the 
region exhibits competitiveness." A 
Caribbean-EU FTA could be made 
compatible with any agreements 
emerging from the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas and with WTO 
rules, which the EU insists are essen­
tial to all its trade agreements.
Although an FTA may eventually 
be best for the Caribbean, a great 
many issues remain to be clarified 
and negotiated. In general, howev­
er, the arguments against an ACP- 
EU free trade agreem ent are most 
valid in the African context. The 
Caribbean is a different matter; sub­
ject to appropriate safeguards, a 
Caribbean FTA tilts the balance 
toward the future of trade liberaliza­
tion rather than the past of trade 
preference. It opens the prospect of 
a customized framework in which 
new instruments can be devised to 
improve competitiveness and devel­
op new products and markets. Such 
gains may not be possible within an 
ACP-wide agreement. On this issue, 
the Caribbean must part company 
with Africa.
E u r o p e a n  In t e r e s t s  a n d  t h e  
C a ribbea n
Britain, France and the 
Netherlands have direct interests in 
the Caribbean, and Spain a marginal 
but significant one. Their responsi­
bilities have m ounted in recent 
years, as drug trafficking and money 
laundering have jo ined  development 
and good governance on the list of 
European concerns. The sum of 
these interests ensures that the 
region commands attention it would 
no t otherwise receive.
New political and social dimen­
sions have also been introduced into 
what was once a largely economic 
portfolio of concerns. The 
Maastricht Treaty, and more recently 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, have 
expanded the EU’s competence in a 
num ber of areas, including social 
policy; common citizenship; cooper­
ation on police, judicial and immi­
gration affairs; and cooperation for 
a common foreign and security poli­
cy. All these rebound on the 
Caribbean and have particular 
importance for the EU’s possessions 
and territories in the region. The 
EU and its m em ber states therefore 
have a considerable interest in stabil­
ity, security and development in the 
Caribbean, giving the Caribbean 
ACP a rarely acknowledged advan­
tage in negotiations.
The operative factor in EU- 
Caribbean relations can best be 
described as “interest plus.”
National and regional interests are 
clearly at work for both parties. In 
addition, the intangibles of shared 
history and shared culture continue 
to play an influential role. It is only 
natural to expect some dilution of 
this common heritage over time, 
and the pace of global change has 
helped to speed up the process. Yet, 
such relationships are by nature 
enduring even as they admit change. 
It is in this spirit that Europe and 
the Caribbean should seek to m ain­
tain their partnership in a renewed 
Lome Convention. ■
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The Banana Wars
Adam Levy
F
ew would have thought 
that a H ade conflict involv­
ing import barriers on 
Latin American bananas 
could drag the US into a 
heated trade conflict with 
the European Union (EU). Yet, on 
March 3, 1999, the Clinton adminis­
tration unilaterally imposed trade 
sanctions on European products val­
ued at $520 million, an amount the 
US claims equals the losses incurred 
by its commercial interests due to 
European banana import restrictions. 
The reprisal came after three favor­
able rulings in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) condemned the 
EU’s banana trade restriction as a vio­
lation of international trade law, 
although a subsequent ruling last 
April trimmed the amount of US 
sanctions authorized to $191.4 mil­
lion.
The roots of the conflict go back to
1993, when Latin America’s banana- 
producing countries entered into a 
dispute with Europe and its former 
Afro-Caribbean-Pacific colonies 
(known collectively as the ACP). In 
what came to be known as the 
Declaration of Guayaquil, on 
February 12, 1993, eight Latin 
American countries pledged to fight 
the European banana import regime 
collectively using GATT’s dispute res­
olution mechanisms. In these days 
before US involvement, the conflict 
was notable for the divergent levels of 
economic power among the major 
players: the European Economic 
Community (EC)—an economic pow­
erhouse—confronted a loose coali-
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Might still makes right in international trade politics
European import regimes have clashed with the interests of banana-exporting companies and non-ACPcountries.
tion made up of Costa Rica, 
Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and 
Venezuela. Given Latin America’s 
emphasis on outward-oriented mod­
els of development, the evolution of 
the conflict during this period pro­
vides important insights as to whether 
international trade dispute mecha­
nisms can function effectively to 
defend Latin America against the 
unfair trading practices of more pow­
erful developed countries.
D o lla r  B ana n as  a n d  A C P  B ananas  
The 1993 EC trade legislation limit­
ed Latin American banana imports to 
two million metric tons beginning in
1994, subjected them to a tariff of 100 
Ecus (US $175) and created a com­
plex import licensing scheme.
Europe justified the trade restrictions 
to protect former ACP colonies, such 
as Jamaica, the Philippines, St. Lucia, 
the Windward Islands, Cameroon and 
the Ivory Coast, and European 
domestic possessions, including 
Guadeloupe, Martinique and the 
Balearic Islands. Since 1975, the 
Lome Convention had granted ACP 
countries trade preferences on 
bananas, with the rationale that many 
ACP producers are smaller and less 
competitive than their Latin 
American counterparts. Under the 
new system, ACP countries and 
European possessions were allocated 
duty-free annual quotas of 857,700 
and 854,000 metric tons, respectively.
Latin Americans greeted Europe’s
new banana trade policy with predic­
tions of economic devastation. Latin 
American producers had increased 
the amount of land under banana 
cultivation in the 1980s, expecting 
increased demand from a newly uni­
fied Europe and Germany. Trade 
analysts estimated that the new restric­
tions would result in a global glut of
900,000 metric tons of surplus pro­
duction.
To the US multinationals that dom­
inate the commercialization of Latin 
American production, the most griev­
ous aspect of Europe’s banana trade 
policy was the complicated licensing 
scheme it introduced. These regula­
tions required an import license for 
every box of bananas brought into 
the EU. O f the newly reduced mar­
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The banana conflict highlights the advantages of regional integration for Latin America.
ket of two million metric tons now 
allocated to Latin America, the EU 
gave many import licenses to 
European primary importers, banana 
distributors and ripeners, even 
though many of these companies had 
not imported bananas directly from 
Latin America before. Once the 
im port regime took effect, the licens­
es were a requirem ent for anyone 
wishing to sell in Europe. They 
could be sold without importing any 
fruit at all for an average price of 
between $4 and $8. United Fruit, the 
largest US exporter to the EU, bore 
the b run t of the licensing scheme.
Its EU market share declined by 
about 25% from 1991 to 1994, 
according to EU officials.
E u r o p e ’s D ivide a n d  C o n q u e r  
S trateg y
Negotiations between the EU and 
Latin America began in earnest in 
December 1993, as part of the clo­
sure of the GATT Uruguay Round. 
From the outset, the Europeans indi­
cated their desire for a prom pt reso­
lution of the dispute, which cast an 
embarrassing light on the trade poli­
cies of a newly formed, borderless 
Europe. The talks centered on four 
main points: quotas for individual 
countries, total ceiling limits for 
imports from Latin America, control 
of import licenses and tariff reduc­
tions.
The European strategy for resolv­
ing the conflict was to exploit the 
cleavages within the coalition of Latin 
American banana-producing nations. 
Only Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Guatemala, Venezuela and Nicaragua 
were GATT members in 1993, and of 
these countries, only two— Costa Rica 
and Colombia—were "substantial 
producers" in the European market. 
Hence, the best EU strategy would be 
to induce Costa Rica and Colombia, 
the pivotal players in the negotia­
tions, to drop their GATT case.
The most divisive issue was the 
EU’s proposal to establish quotas for 
individual countries. Quotas, by their 
very nature, penalize the most effi­
cient producers of a given commodi­
ty by freezing their market share, 
while offering stability to producers 
with higher costs who are under 
threat from low-cost producers.
Ecuador, the world’s largest and low­
est-cost producer of bananas, strongly 
opposed a quota, since between 1991 
and 1993 it had become the single 
largest exporter to the EU. Costa 
Rica, on the other hand, was more 
willing to accept a quota. Costa 
Rican producers had to contend with 
higher costs, due to higher wages and 
overhead. Before being displaced by 
Ecuador, Costa Rica had been the 
largest exporter of bananas to 
Europe and thus could argue that it 
deserved the largest market share.
The EU’s December 1994 proposal 
was weighted heavily in favor of Costa 
Rica and Colombia. It proposed 
allocating the market as follows:
Costa Rica, 23.4%; Colombia, 22%; 
Ecuador, 20.2%; Panama, 19.7%; 
Honduras, 6.8%; Nicaragua, 1.9%; 
and Guatemala, 1.5%. Venezuela 
and other "third party" countries 
jointly received a 4.5% market share. 
Further sweetening the deal, the 
Europeans recognized a Costa Rican 
demand that Latin America control 
Europe’s import licenses. However, 
in a move that would further compli­
cate the selling of bananas in the 
European market, the EU created a 
entire new layer of licenses called 
"export licenses,” of which Latin 
America would get 70%. As a final 
concession, the Europeans raised the 
Latin America quota to 2.1 million 
metric tons in 1994 and 2.2 million 
in 1995, and lowered the Latin 
American tariff from 100 Ecus ($100) 
to 75 Ecus ($75).
The deal meant that Costa Rica 
received the largest market share, 
even though it had lost its status as 
the leading banana exporter to 
Europe in the early 1990s. Colombia 
received the second largest market 
share, despite the fact that Panama 
traditionally had exported more 
bananas to Europe. Costa Rica and 
Colombia would also benefit dispro­
portionately from the export licenses. 
Both had large contingents of nation­
al producers who would gain eco­
nomic leverage vis-a-vis the American
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multinationals by holding the licens­
es. Countries such as Panama, 
Honduras and Guatemala, whose 
national producers were a smaller 
and less potent political force, valued 
the export licenses less.
Despite a GATT ruling in January 
1994 condemning the EU’s new 
trade regime as a violation of interna­
tional trade law, four countries ulti­
mately accepted quotas. In what 
became known as the Framework 
Agreement, Costa Rica received 
23.4% of the market. Colombia 
received 21%, while Nicaragua set­
tled for 3% and Venezuela for 2%.
In addition, the EU designated 4.3% 
of the Latin American quota to non- 
traditional suppliers. Honduras, 
Panama, Guatemala and Ecuador, of 
which Guatemala was the only GATT 
member, rejected their quotas and 
vowed to continue pressuring the EU 
for a more acceptable solution using
GATT/WTO procedures. These 
countries were lumped into a "non­
quota" category by the Europeans, 
entitling them to approximately 
46.3% of the European market. 
Mexico, also a banana producer but 
not a large exporter to Europe, 
played a m inor role in the negotia­
tions and joined the group of hold­
outs.
C lash  o f  t h e  T itans 
The US finally entered the conflict 
in 1996, lodging a complaint in the 
WTO with the other protesting coun­
tries. After the WTO ruled against 
the EU in 1997, the Europeans modi­
fied their import regime slightly by 
abolishing the export licenses. 
Otherwise, they maintained many of 
the regime’s major tenets. It was not 
until the US inflicted reciprocal eco­
nomic damage under Section 301 of 
US trade law that the Europeans
returned to the negotiating table and 
pledged again to make their banana 
import regime WTO-compliant.
This case suggests that the threat of 
collateral economic damage, when 
applied within the framework of the 
WTO, is sometimes the only way to 
dislodge the unsavory trade practices 
of powerful nations. The implication 
for Latin America is that regional 
integration may be the best way to 
protect the area’s trading rights. 
Regional trading blocs enhance Latin 
America’s attractiveness as a market, 
along with its capacity to inflict recip­
rocal economic damage when devel­
oped countries violate members’ 
trading rights. With US sanctions 
beginning to affect European 
exporters, the question remains 
whether the Europeans will follow 
through with their pledge or accept 
the consequences of US trade penal­
ties. ■
UN IVER SITY PRESS OF
v r id a J
Panama's Poor
Victims, Agents, and Historymakers 
Gloria Rudolf
"An excellent long-term, in-depth 
study of a rural community in 
Panama. It is essential reading for 
scholars interested in rural Latin 
America and the forces which shape 
it."—John R. Bort, East Carolina 
University
July. 15 b&w photos. Cloth, $49.95
Buenos Aires
Perspectives on the City 
and Cultural Production 
David William Foster 
"Full of sharp insights and 
surprising departures. It is an 
unprecedented study.. . .  The 
analyses are carried out with a risk- 
taking boldness."—Naomi 
Lindstrom, University of Texas, 
Austin
27 b&w photos. Cloth, $39.95
Women and Urban 
Change in San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, 1820-1868
Felix V. Matos Rodriguez 
"A potential watershed in Puerto 
Rican historiography.. . .  the only 
women's history work which 
investigates the full sweep of the 
tumultuous 19th century in Puerto 
Rico."—Eileen J. Findlay, American 
University 
304 pp. Cloth, $49.95
Trade Conditions 
and Labor Rights
U.S. Initiatives, Dominican and 
Central American Responses 
Henry J. Frundt 
"Far and away the best single 
source on worker-rights struggles 
and issues in the Caribbean 
Basin."—Mark Hager, Washington 
College of Law 
416 pp. Cloth, $55.00
G AIN ESV ILLE, TALLA H A SSEE, TAMPA, BOCA RATON, PEN SACOLA, ORLAND O, MIAM I, JACKSO N VILLE
Critical Acts
Latin American Women
and Cultural Criticism
Elizabeth A. Marchant
"Insightful and often brilliant. . .  especially
important in countering the traditional thought
that posits the notion that women [Lucia Miguel
Pereira, Victoria Ocampo, and Gabriela Mistral]
did not engage in the production of culture and
knowledge in 20th-century Latin America."—
Susan C. Quinlan, University of Georgia
July. Cloth, $49.95
Gabriela 
Mistral, 
winner of the 
1945 Nobel 
Prize for 
Literature, 
speaking to 
the United 
Nations, 1957.
Order through full-service 
booksellers, w ith VISA or 
M/C toll free: 1-800-226-3822, 
or though our w ebsite at 
http://www.upf.com
Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two
Reports: Brazil
Crisis in the Brazilian Amazon
Janet M. Cheniela
I
n the decade between 1988 
and 1998, Brazilian policy 
regarding the Amazon rainfor­
est abrupdy turned from 
“brown” to “green.” This was 
most apparent in Amazonas, 
the largest state in Brazil, accounting 
for one-third of the 1.9 million 
square miles designated as Legal 
Amazonia. The shift to preservation­
ist policies is best explained not by 
growing environmental awareness, 
but rather by political and economic 
processes occurring at the interna­
tional level. This article traces the 
reversal in political positioning, sug­
gesting contributing factors that may 
explain changing policies toward the 
Amazonian forest and its preserva­
tion.
T h e  B o o m  o f  B lack  G o l d
The Brazilian Amazon has long 
been characterized by a continuum 
of slow economic growth, interrupt­
ed at intervals by peaks of economic 
prosperity. For four hundred years— 
from the sixteenth through the mid­
twentieth centuries—wealth was 
derived principally from the export 
of forest products. The most eco­
nomically significant of these prod­
ucts was rubber, latex extracted from 
the Amazonian tree Hevea brasiliensis. 
Demand for this commodity surged 
in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, when first vulcanization, and 
then the nascent automotive indus­
try, catapulted world demand for rub­
ber to unprecedented levels.
Rubber was a minor export in the 
first half of the nineteenth century.
Janet M. Chernela is professor of anthro­
pology at Honda International 
University.
In the mid 1800s, however, advances 
in vulcanization processes increased 
the strength and resilience of rubber 
and broadened its application to a 
wide range of commodities. Rubber 
became Brazil’s principal export in 
1871, and by 1909 Amazonia was the 
source of 94.4% of the world’s rub­
ber supply.
Brazil’s rubber boom came to an 
end in 1913, when managed planta­
tions in Malaysia outperform ed 
Brazilian forest extractors. Previously, 
Asia had contributed only minimal 
amounts of rubber to the world mar­
ket (four tons in 1900, compared to 
Brazil’s 27,650). By 1913, however, 
Asia had overtaken Brazil as the 
world’s largest rubber producer. By 
1918, Amazonia’s share of the world 
rubber supply had fallen to 10.9%. 
Just before World War II, when 
Brazilian rubber came into tempo­
rary demand by Allied nations, its 
contribution to the world market had 
diminished to 1.4%.
With no export commodity to 
replace rubber, the economy of the 
central Amazon entered a period of 
stagnation. The region’s wealth was 
concentrated in the city of Manaus, 
strategically situated near the conflu­
ence of the Negro and Amazon 
Rivers. As the rubber boom dissipat­
ed, Manaus contracted to a fraction 
of its former size, its revenue sources 
limited to the export of a few raw for­
est products.
A B o o m  o f  a  D iffer en t  K in d : T h e  
Zo n a  F ran c a  o f  M ana u s
Manaus was lifted out of its stagna­
tion in 1967, when the Brazilian gov­
ernm ent decreed a portion of the 
city to be duty free. The decree out­
lined fiscal incentives from federal, 
state and municipal governments to
attract industry to the north by allow­
ing exemptions on steep import 
duties. The plan was designed to 
attract industrial development, partic­
ularly electronic assembly plants, that 
relied on imported components.
The duty-free area was designated the 
Zona Franca de Manaus, or Manaus 
Free Trade Zone.
The decree came in the context of 
a Brazilian economy that was rigor­
ously protected by trade barriers. In 
the 1960s, approximately 3000 prod­
ucts were prohibited from import, 
while many others were subject to 
hefty import taxes of 80%. Firms 
within the federally designated free 
trade zone could sell imported items 
at prices that were not available else­
where in Brazil, providing them with 
strong competitive advantages.
Given these conditions, it was cost 
effective for Brazilians from the south 
to travel to Manaus to purchase 
imported goods. Despite the city’s 
distance from Rio de Janeiro and Sao 
Paulo, thousands of Brazilians from 
the metropolitan south traveled there 
annually to purchase tax-free luxury 
and electronic goods. A passenger 
leaving Manaus was permitted to 
carry up to $2,000 in tax-free import­
ed items.
Investors reacted quickly to the 
new fiscal incentives. Having lan­
guished for five decades, the econo­
my of Amazonas state and its princi­
pal city, Manaus, was spurred forward 
by new industrial and commercial 
development. Between 1970 and 
1990, the zone attracted over 600 
firms, including Honda, Kodak, 
Olivetti, Philco/Ford, Philips, Sanyo, 
Seiko, Sharp, Sony, Telefunken, 3M, 
Toshiba and Xerox. This growth, in 
turn, carried with it other parts of the 
tertiary sector, particularly tourism.
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Global integration, the Zona Franca of Manaus and ecotourism
This monument was built in 1899 across from the Manaus Opera House— itself a tes­
tament to the rubber boom— to commemorate the opening of Amazonian ports and 
rivers to foreign navigation. The figure at the top is an allegory of commerce.
Domestic tourism to Manaus fueled 
$150 million in hotel construction.
Employment rose correspondingly. 
By 1989, virtually all the state’s rev­
enue came from the tariff-free indus­
trial sector, which produced $7 bil­
lion in products and employed
137,000 people. Once a sleepy river­
front town, by 1990 Manaus ranked 
as Brazil’s largest manufacturing cen­
ter after Sao Paulo. The lure of jobs 
caused the city’s population to surge 
from 173,000 in 1960 to 1.5 million 
in 1990. Two-thirds of the popula­
tion of Amazonas was now concen­
trated in Manaus.
T h e  P o litic s  o f  F o r e st  
D ev elo pm en t
During the period of growth of the 
Zona Franca, the prevailing rhetoric 
among national policy makers and 
local Amazonas elites emphasized 
development without regard for for­
est preservation. Throughout the 
1970s and ‘80s, Brazil’s federal gov­
ernm ent spent $7.5 billion to subsi­
dize deforestation, including pro­
grams that subsidized the clearing of 
large tracts of forest for pasturage. In 
less than two decades, at least 300 
large-scale ranching operations 
replaced formerly forested lands. 
Three-time Governor of Amazonas 
Gilberto Mestrinho pursued a policy 
of distributing free chain saws to any 
colonist who would “develop” the for­
est. The policy remained in place 
through the early 1990s.
The ideology of the times was 
expressed in the 1985 speech, “Nossa 
Natureza” (“O ur Nature”), in which 
President Jose Sarney stressed the 
threat to Brazilian national sovereign­
ty posed by international environ­
mentalists whose preservationist lan­
guage, Sarney claimed, obscured
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Political and economic elites once eager to cut down the Amazonian rainforest now see it as an environmentally correct source of cash.
their own intentions to exploit the 
riches of the forest. Preservation 
became synonymous with foreign 
appropriation.
The anti-environmentalist lobby 
reflected the views of prom inent 
commercial interests as well as those 
of impoverished rural residents, for 
whom the industrialized duty-free 
zone provided employment. 
Preservation was regarded as a frivoli­
ty of the wealthy. Former Governor 
Mestrinho was quoted as saying that 
foreign ecologists “want the Amazon 
to be kept like a circus, with us as the 
monkeys.”
Opposition to forest preservation 
also emerged from the military, 
which favored rapid development 
along the northern frontiers to 
ensure Brazil’s sovereignty over its 
hinterland. In 1985, vast tracts of 
Amazonia were placed under nation­
al security in a program known as 
Calha Norte, combining coloniza­
tion, agriculture and security along 
the northern borders.
T h e  G r o w in g  E c o n o m ic  A r g u m e n t  
in  Fa vo r  o f  F o r e st  P reser v atio n ; o r  
How B u sin e ss  a n d  P o litica l  E lites 
in  A m a zo n a s  L earned  t o  S t o p  
W o r r y in g  a n d  L o v e  N a tu r e  
Four concurrent processes con­
tributed to change the attitudes of 
Amazonian business and political 
elites toward environmental preserva­
tion: 1) the failure of large-scale colo­
nization and ranching initiatives; 2) 
the loosening of trade restrictions to 
open the Brazilian economy; 3) the 
recognition of international eco- 
tourism as a potential source of 
income; and 4) new fiscal incentives 
from international sources targeting 
development projects that could be 
judged both economically and eco­
logically “sustainable.”
By the latter half of the 1980s, the 
policy of subsidizing large ranching
ventures, intended to bring prosperi­
ty to the north, had clearly failed. By 
this time, more than 80% of the large 
landholders receiving benefits had 
abandoned their lands or sold them 
to speculators.
At the same time, Brazil’s govern­
ment began to phase out trade pro­
tections. In 1990, prices for import­
ed electronic goods and household 
appliances were 50% to 275% higher 
in Brazil than overseas. Brazil came 
under increasing pressure from inter­
national entities, including multilater­
al lending institutions, to remove bar­
riers to free trade. In 1991, President 
Fernando Collor de Melo removed 
import bans on more than 1,000 
products and reduced import tariffs 
from 80% to 20%. Currently, Brazil’s 
tax on imported goods is approxi­
mately 12%.
New global integration posed a 
threat to the economy of Manaus.
The success of a free-trade zone in
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the north depended upon protec­
tions granted by the federal govern­
ment. Removal of trade barriers 
would eliminate much of the zone’s 
competitive advantage. In 
Amazonas, the removal of trade bar­
riers was regarded as an indication of 
oscillating federal commitment to 
the region. Retail trade and domes­
tic tourism in Manaus’s Zona Franca 
began to decline as those protections 
were threatened.
Travel to Manaus from the densely 
populated south is limited by dis­
tance and the remoteness of the loca­
tion. Access by air from Brazil’s 
largest cities is time consuming and 
expensive. Between 1980 and 1990, 
a domestic flight from Rio de Janeiro 
to Manaus (2,862 kms) took four 
hours and cost more than an interna­
tional flight to Miami. Travel to 
Manaus for retail purchases, there­
fore, was cost effective only if the 
price of im ported goods within Brazil 
remained at artificially high levels.
Removal of Brazil’s protections on 
foreign goods eroded Manaus’s price 
advantage and sent shoppers else­
where. Between 1986 and 1991, 
Brazilian visitors to the city’s Zona 
Franca had averaged 175,000 annual­
ly. With the removal of trade protec­
tions, domestic tourism to Amazonia 
plummeted, dropping from 150,000 
in 1989 to 96,973 in 1990-a decline 
of 60% in one year. Correspondingly, 
income and employment in the Zona 
Franca also dropped. Revenues from 
national sales in the zone dropped 
from $6.5 billion in 1990 to $3.6 bil­
lion in 1992, and remain below 1991 
levels.
Among the goals of the Zona 
Franca were job  creation and income 
for the northern populations and the 
consolidation of liaisons between the 
local economy and the overseas mar­
ket. Manaus had become the fastest- 
growing urban center and source of 
employment in the north of Brazil. 
Between 1990 and 1992, however, 
employment in the Zona Franca 
dropped dramatically, from 76,798
workers to 36,537. Salary expendi­
tures in 1999 were the lowest since 
the duty-free zone’s implementation. 
Indeed, the draw away from the rural 
sector into the urban may have 
served to deter deforestation by con­
centrating an otherwise dispersed 
population.
T h e  G r e e n in g  o f  C om m erce
The decline in domestic tourism to 
the Zona Franca coincided with ris­
ing expectations for a surge in inter­
national ecotourism, with rainforests 
among the favored destinations. A 
1991 poll of international travelers 
showed that 47% considered natural 
features to be major criteria in vaca­
tion planning, and an OAS study the 
same year predicted that the num ber 
of foreigners participating in nature 
tours in the Amazon would triple 
from 123,000 in 1988 to at least
375,000 by 1999.
Hoping that “green” tourism 
would pick up where consumer 
tourism left off, the Amazonas busi­
ness community reversed its position 
on rainforest preservation. Before 
1990, environmental protections had 
been considered a luxury of wealthy 
nations; now, these same protections 
came to be regarded as economically 
advantageous. With tourism infra­
structure already in place, a rapidly 
expanding world market in eco­
tourism, and a commodity in the 
form of “the largest rainforest on 
earth,” Amazonian policy makers 
came to view ecotourism as a source 
of economic return for nature 
preservation.
The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio 
(UNCED) helped draw international 
attention to the Amazon and served 
as a lever to promote international 
investment in Brazil. In 1993, the 
Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) and the World Bank approved 
credits exceeding one billion dollars 
for projects in the Amazon. Credits 
targeted environmental preservation 
and economic development. IDB 
funding in 1996 and 1997 con­
tributed to the development of a 
Tourism Development Program 
(Prodetur) and provided $200 mil­
lion to Brazil’s Ministry of 
Environment. Half of the money 
financed private sector investments 
in Amazonian ecotourism, and the 
other half was set aside for efforts to 
improve and expand conditions for 
ecotourism projects. The funding 
included the production of educa­
tional materials aimed at making 
local Amazonian communities aware 
that, in the words of Aldemir 
Paraguassu, Secretary of Amazonian 
Affairs, “nature sells.” Local 
Amazonian institutions, including 
those geared toward industrialization 
of the Zona Franca, also were influ­
enced by incentives from multilateral 
banking agencies to prom ote eco­
tourism. The result was the greening 
of the duty-free zone itself.
The 1990s marked a dramatic shift 
in Brazilian government and busi­
ness attitudes toward the rainforest, 
influenced mostly by international 
political and economic pressures. 
Prior to 1990, business and political 
leaders in Amazonas consistently 
opposed measures to preserve the 
rainforest. Both the private and pub­
lic sectors actively supported efforts 
to clear the forest for ranching. In 
the last decade, however, the same 
sectors came to regard the forest 
itself as a source of revenue. 
According to the Brazilian news mag­
azine Veja, the federal government 
spent $7.5 billion to subsidize defor­
estation activities in the 1970s.
“Now,” the magazine reported in late 
1997, “if the government is consider­
ing any program to subsidize 
Amazonia, it is considering an 
aggressive program to stimulate 
tourism.” ■
Data published here were derived from the 
Superintendencia da Zona Franca de 
Manaus (SUFRAMA) and the Empresa 
Amazonense de Turismo (EMAMTUR), 
now the Secretary for Tourism and 
Culture, among other sources.
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The Other Journalism
Jose Luis Benavides
“I researched and narrated the tremendous facts to give them 
the widest possible publicity, to make them inspire fear, to never 
let them happen again. ”
—Rodolfo Walsh
n the m orning of 
November 16, 1959, 
Trum an Capote was 
flipping through the 
pages of The New York 
Times when he 
stopped on page 39 to read a UPI 
news story from Holcomb, Kansas, 
headlined “Wealthy Farmer, 3 of 
Family Slain.” Capote had been 
looking for ideas to turn journalism  
into a “serious” literary art form, the 
“nonfiction novel,” and this crime in 
Holcomb seemed to him to be a per­
fect opportunity to accomplish his 
objective. The result was his cele­
brated book In Cold Blood.
Three years earlier, on the night 
of June 9, 1956, Rodolfo Walsh, a 
young writer in La Plata, Argentina, 
was playing chess in the Club 
Capablanca when the sounds of 
explosions and shotguns interrupted 
his game. The noise came from the 
Plaza San Martin, the site of the 
heaviest fighting of a doom ed army 
insurrection in support of Juan 
Domingo Peron against the military 
regime of General Pedro Enrique 
Aramburo. That night, Walsh later 
learned, the police executed a 
group of civilians in a garbage 
dum p—five were killed, one was 
seriously wounded, and five more 
managed to escape. The police had 
arrested the 11 m en as they listened
Dr. Jose Luis Benavides is a founding 
member• of Corre(i)o, a nonprofit organi­
zation devoted to the dissemination of 
Latin American and Latino journalism. 
He is co-author ofEscribir en prensa: 
Redaction informativa e interpretativa 
(Mexico City: Alhambra/Longman, 
1997), a college textbook for journalism 
students.
to a boxing match on the radio in 
the house of a m an allegedly 
involved in the uprising.
For a while, Walsh thought he 
could forget the episode and contin­
ue writing detective stories. But six 
months later, on December 18, a 
friend told him the story of Juan 
Carlos Livraga, a victim of the clan­
destine execution, who had been 
shot in the face but survived. Soon 
after, Walsh began publishing stories 
in the opposition press about 
Livraga’s case. He tracked down 
other survivors, changed his name, 
bought a gun and went into hiding. 
His nonfiction novel based on the 
case, Operacion masacre, was first pub­
lished in December 1957, eight years 
before In Cold Blood.
E n d in g  t h e  S ilenc e
Today, both Capote and Walsh are 
considered, in their respective coun­
tries, pioneers of the nonfiction 
novel. In truth, neither writer 
invented this art form, although 
both influenced its development. 
Unlike Capote, however, Walsh was 
not trying consciously to create a 
new literary genre when he wrote 
Operacion masacre. He wrote the 
book out of indignation—to 
denounce a crime unrecorded in 
the mainstream press and to serve 
the cause of justice. “I researched 
and narrated the trem endous facts,” 
Walsh wrote, “to give them the
widest possible publicity, to make 
them  inspire fear, to never let them 
happen again.”
While Capote rem ained only spo­
radically interested in journalism , 
Walsh was a journalist throughout 
his life and turned his reporting and 
writing into politically explicit tasks. 
His work has had a growing influ­
ence on contem poraryjournalism  in 
Latin America because it exemplifies 
a key challenge faced by indepen­
dent journalists: the need to over­
come the silence of the mainstream 
press—the result of fear or collu­
sion—about crimes committed by 
the state apparatus.
“During many months I have seen 
the voluntary silence of the whole 
‘serious press’ about this heinous 
massacre, and I have felt ashamed,” 
Walsh wrote in the introduction to 
the first edition of Operacion masacre. 
In 1964, in the preface to the sec­
ond edition, he expressed even 
greater disillusionment: “One 
believes that a story like this one— 
with a dead body that speaks—is 
going to be disputed in the news­
rooms; one believes that this is a 
race against time, that at any time a 
big daily will send a dozen reporters 
and photographers like in the 
movies...It is like a joke because, 
seven years later, one can review the 
newspaper archives, and this story 
did not exist then, nor does it exist 
now.”
0
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Rodolfo Walsh’s legacy of socially responsible reporting
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It is precisely their departure from the notion of objectivity and 
their insistence on presenting alternative, counterhegemonic 
accounts of events that has made these journalists’ work so 
meaningful.
Walsh’s book became one of the 
first major contem porary examples 
of what one might call Latin 
American “new” journalism. This 
informal literary and journalistic 
movement denounced state crimes 
that went unreported by the region’s 
mainstream press and influenced the 
development of independent jo u r­
nalism in Latin America. Gabriel 
Garcia Marquez’s The Story of a 
Shipwrecked Sailor (1955), for 
instance, denounced the Colombian 
navy for the deaths of a group of 
sailors who were washed overboard 
with ill-secured contraband from a 
navy destroyer. O ther examples of 
this genre include Elena 
Poniatowska’s Massacre in Mexico 
(1971), which chronicled the 1968 
army massacre of hundreds of stu­
dent demonstrators in Mexico City; 
Carlos Alberto Luppi’s Araceli 
(1979), which exposed the coverup 
of the kidnapping and assassination 
of a teenager by local magnates in 
the Brazilian city of Vitoria; and 
Miguel Bonasso’s Recuerdo de la 
muerte (1984), which narrated in a 
spy thriller format the activities of 
the Argentine military’s internation­
al operatives during the so-called 
dirty war.
Although the literary importance 
of these and other works has been 
widely studied, their journalistic sig­
nificance has been ignored or 
underestimated. Unlike its counter­
part in the US, Latin America’s new 
journalism  is not identified formally 
as a specific movement. Two factors 
contribute to this oversight. First, 
some Latin American literary critics 
and journalists exhibit a colonialist 
mentality. A Spanish-language guide
to Story of a Shipwrecked Sailor, for 
example, cites Tom Wolfe as one of 
Garcia Marquez’s main influences, 
despite the fact that the reportage 
was first published in 1955—seven 
years before Wolfe got his first news­
paper job. Second, those who main­
tain that journalists must be objec­
tive, impartial observers of events 
believe that most Latin American 
new journalists practice “advocate 
journalism .” Instead of being impar­
tial, critics charge, these journalists 
prom ote social justice and social 
change. But it is precisely their 
departure from the notion of objec­
tivity and their insistence on present­
ing alternative, counterhegemonic 
accounts of events that has made 
these individuals’ work so meaning­
ful for Latin American journalism.
For instance, Poniatowska’s writ­
ings about the 1968 massacre of stu­
dents in Mexico City might be con­
sidered biased because her own 
brother was among those killed. Yet, 
since most of the mainstream 
Mexican press only recorded the 
official, manicured version of events, 
Massacre in Mexico quickly became a 
standard college textbook that serves 
as a good example of reportage for 
journalism  students.
Rodolfo Walsh advocated this 
other kind of journalism, one that 
refuses to be an accomplice of injus­
tice. He and other Latin American 
new journalists helped to establish 
and sustain independent news media 
outlets and spaces within the main­
stream press for the practice of inde­
pendent, investigative journalism, 
particularly in periods of extreme 
institutional repression. They prac­
ticed what some call “socially com­
mitted” journalism, opposing the 
notion of objectivity valued in main­
stream US journalism  and embrac­
ing instead a style closer in spirit to 
that practiced by muckraking, inves­
tigative and socially responsible jo u r­
nalists. Their work has directly and 
indirectly influenced the training of 
young journalists and has helped to 
strengthen freedom of speech in the 
region.
A L ife ’s W o r k  C u t  S h o r t
By the time Capote’s In Cold Blood 
was published in 1965, Walsh had 
already published two editions of 
Operacion masacre. Also, together 
with a group of famous journalists 
and writers—including Garcia 
Marquez and fellow Colombian 
Plinio Mendoza, the Uruguayan 
Juan Carlos Onetti, and the 
Argentines Jorge Masetti and 
Rogelio Garcia Lupo—he helped to 
establish the Latin American news 
agency Prensa Latina. Working for 
that agency in the early 1960s, Walsh 
became known among his colleagues 
as “the man who outdid the CIA” 
after he deciphered a secret 
telegram from Guatemala detailing 
the plans of CIA-sponsored Cuban 
exiles to invade Cuba.
In 1968, Walsh established the 
Peronista newsweekly CGT in collab­
oration with Horacio Verbitsky, today 
the most respected independent 
journalist in Argentina. CGT circu­
lated legally until mid-1969 and clan­
destinely until February 1970, when 
the government forced it to close. 
Walsh’s work with the weekly gave 
him material for a second nonfiction 
book, i Quien mato a Rosendo ?, pub­
lished in 1969. This reportage 
described the m urder of a union 
leader at the hands of corrupt labor 
union bosses who served the inter­
ests of the Argentine government 
and foreign corporations.
Between 1972 and 1973, Walsh 
worked in a community project in 
the villas miseria (shantytowns) of 
Buenos Aires, teaching journalism
24 Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two
Features: The "New" Journalism
and helping students publish the 
Semanario Villero. By 1975, when his 
last nonfiction book was published, 
he had become a m ember of the 
M ontoneros—a leftist, nationalist 
faction within Peronismo that 
turned into an urban guerrilla move­
ment. He served as the crime editor 
of Noticias, a M ontonero daily closed 
by the government the following 
year.
After the military coup in 
Argentina on March 24, 1976, Walsh 
and Verbitsky organized the clandes­
tine news agency ANCLA and 
denounced the military’s hum an 
rights abuses. On September 29 of 
that year, Walsh’s daughter 
Victoria—also a m em ber of the 
M ontoneros—killed herself to avoid 
capture during a military assault on 
a guerrilla hideout. Six months 
later, on March 25, 1977, Walsh him­
self was m urdered by a military 
squad sent to kidnap him. Just 
before the attack, he mailed his 
famous “Open Letter to the Military 
Jun ta” to Argentine newspapers. He 
had finished writing it the day 
before, on the first anniversary of 
the coup. At the time, no Argentine 
newspaper dared publish this letter, 
described by Garcia Marquez as “a 
masterpiece of universal journalism .” 
It circulated clandestinely in 
Argentina, found its way to some 
Latin American independent media, 
and was later published by the 
French magazine Esprit and the US 
magazine Dissent.
Emile Zola’s “J ’Accuse” and the 
entire Dreyfus affair pale in compari­
son to Walsh’s fate. After Zola 
accused the French military of falsely 
convicting Captain Alfred Dreyfus 
and then covering up the affair, he 
was charged with libel and forced to 
leave France. But justice eventually 
prevailed, and Zola’s letter became a 
powerful symbol of the fight for free­
dom of expression. Walsh accused 
the military ju n ta  of genocide and 
provided the most detailed, critical 
and docum ented appraisal of the
military regime inside and outside 
Argentina. He was m urdered, the 
jun ta  banned his writing, and his 
contribution to the fight for free­
dom of expression went unrecog­
nized.
Wa l s h ’s L egacy
Despite the totalitarian nature of 
the military junta, Walsh’s voice 
could not be silenced completely. 
Neither military surveillance nor the 
risk of being killed or arrested 
stopped journalism  students from 
learning about him and reading his 
books.
“Walsh suddenly became our jo u r­
nalistic model,” writes Gabriela 
Cerruti, editor-in-chief of the news­
magazine Trespuntos. H er book, Los 
herederos del sikncio, recounts her 
years as a journalism  student at the 
University of La Plata during the mil­
itary dictatorship. Before the 1976 
military coup, the journalism  pro­
gram at this university was the most 
prestigious in the country. Its pro­
fessors included such respected 
names as Gregorio Selser, Silvio 
Frondizi and Eduardo Galeano. In 
the first few years following the 
coup, 36 students and professors out 
of a total of approximately 220 “dis­
appeared.” The school closed for a 
year and a half; it reopened under 
heavy military surveillance in 1978. 
Librarians were required to fill out a 
form for each book checked out of 
the library, making the information 
available to the military to identify 
“subversives.” Even in this repressive 
environment, Cerruti remembers 
that some librarians managed to 
smuggle Walsh’s books to journalism  
students.
Walsh influenced many of the 
reporters who worked with him, 
some of whom went on to become 
well-known independent journalists. 
In Recuerdo de la muerte, Miguel 
Bonasso, who worked with Walsh at 
the M ontonero daily, referred to 
him as “my mentor.” Horacio 
Verbitsky, a colleague at CGT and
ANCLA, edited a book in the mid- 
1980s about Walsh’s clandestine 
years. He described those times to 
the Mexican journalist Alma 
Guillermoprieto as “the militant, 
rancorous, aggressive, unforgiving 
tradition of the nineteen seventies.”
In a book published in 1997 about 
Argentina’s greatest journalists and 
publications, Walsh ranked third— 
behind Verbitsky and Jacobo 
Timmerman—in the num ber of 
entries to his name. That same year, 
his surviving partner, Lilia Ferreyra, 
and his daughter, Patricia Walsh, 
convinced the Argentine Congress to 
reopen his case, find his body and 
determ ine how he was killed.
The growing recognition of 
Walsh's journalistic legacy culminat­
ed on March 25, 1998, when the 
University of La Plata’s School of 
Journalism announced its first 
Rodolfo Walsh Journalism Awards. 
The occasion was timed to commem­
orate the twenty-first anniversary of 
his assassination. It served as an 
implicit rebuke to those who do not 
count Walsh among the 91 journal­
ists killed in Argentina between 1976 
and 1983, on the grounds that he 
was not an impartial reporter. This 
group includes the two most widely 
available books about Latin 
American journalism  published in 
the US during Argentina’s military 
dictatorship, Robert Pierce’s Keeping 
the Flame (1979) and Marvin Alisky’s 
Latin American Media (1981), both of 
which fail to mention Walsh at all.
The Rodolfo Walsh Journalism 
Awards promise to inspire another 
kind of journalist: one who strives to 
be as innovative in literary terms as 
Capote, as investigative as Ida Tarbell 
and George Seldes, and as danger­
ous to those who abuse power as the 
German journalist Gunter Wallraff. 
The awards may also trigger a 
renewed interest in the dissemina­
tion of the work of Latin America’s 
new journalists, prom oting both 
freedom of expression and an inde­
pendent and responsible press. ■
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Building the Fourth Estate
Chappell Lawson
I
n ju n e  1995, President 
Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico 
held a press conference in the 
town of Cuauhtitlan. The 
president was seeking to reas­
sure his fellow citizens that 
their country, then in the midst of 
deep economic crisis and political 
turmoil, was back on the right track. 
In the course of his remarks, Zedillo 
made reference to a group of “bad 
guys” (malosos) within the ruling 
Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRO. These naughty officials, 
Zedillo implied, were responsible for 
many of Mexico’s recent troubles, 
including the 1994 assassinations of 
the PRI’s leader, Jose Francisco Ruiz 
Massieu, and the party’s presidential 
candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio.
Mexican journalists responded vig­
orously to Zedillo’s comments. Did 
he m ean that ruling party officials 
were responsible for Colosio’s m ur­
der? Who, exactly, were the officials 
in question? Could the country’s 
problems really be blamed on a 
small group of individuals, however 
nefarious? And was “bad guys” really 
an appropriate term  to describe 
such people, given that their 
extracurricular activities apparendy 
included drug trafficking and politi­
cal assassination?
The vehemence of the journalists’ 
reaction surprised many observers. 
Traditionally, interactions between 
the president and the press in 
Mexico were carefully scripted 
affairs. Questions were often plant­
ed by government officials; indepen­
dent newspapers were underrepre-
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sented, if at all; and the entire per­
formance was carefully edited before 
being rebroadcast by the country’s 
reliably pro-government media con­
glomerate, Televisa. Aggressive or 
hostile inquiries were simply not 
part of the regularly scheduled pro­
gramming.
Reporters’ reactions to the malosos 
incident exemplified the changes 
that have occurred in Mexico’s 
media. Over the past two decades, 
independent publications have 
em erged and flourished, supplanti­
ng their more staid and traditional 
counterparts. Feisty talk-radio shows 
have come to dominate the airwaves 
in Mexico’s largest cities. Even 
broadcast television, long viewed as a 
sort of private Ministry of 
Information, has begun to devote 
m ore coverage to opposition and 
civic groups. These changes have 
brought increased media attention 
to civil society and its viewpoints, 
m ore even-handed coverage of elec­
toral campaigns, more incisive criti­
cism of the political system, and— 
perhaps most dramatically—more 
aggressive investigation of potential 
scandals.
T h e  R ise  o f  I n d e p e n d e n t  M e d ia : 
S o m e  T h e o ries
W hat caused the remarkable trans­
formation of Mexico’s media? One 
familiar explanation for the success 
of Mexico’s emerging fourth estate 
is the general mellowing of the 
country’s political climate over the 
last decade. In theory, without this 
political thaw, the government could 
have squashed any independent 
publications—as it did when it 
helped eject an independent- 
m inded team of editors from 
Excelsior newspaper in 1976. In this
sense, a modicum of political liberal­
ization was probably necessary for 
Mexico’s independent media to sur­
vive and establish themselves.
At the same time, it would be inac­
curate to portray political reform as 
the principal driver of media open­
ing. Mexican journalists insist that 
any autonomous space the media 
now enjoy is due to changes within 
civil society and the media them ­
selves, which gradually pried control 
out of the governm ent’s hands. As 
Jose Gutierrez-Vivo, host of the pop­
ular independent radio show 
“Monitor,” pu t it in 1996, “The 
media did not get opened from 
above. We opened it. We broke the 
limits.” Journalists are especially 
adam ant about the limited influence 
of form er President Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari (1988-94), sometimes 
credited in the United States with 
encouraging media openness.
Salinas initiated a num ber of modest 
reforms in press-government rela­
tions and ended the practice of pay­
ing bribes (known as embutes or chay- 
otes) to journalists at the presidential 
palace itself. In general, however, 
his administration was never sympa­
thetic to Mexico’s independent 
press, and it became increasingly 
abusive toward the end of his term. 
This impression was shared by virtu­
ally all of the independent journal­
ists interviewed in Mexico in 1995- 
1997, regardless of their opinions of 
Salinas’s program  of market- 
oriented reform. According to 
Gutierrez-Vivo, “Salinas was the pres­
ident who was hardest on the media. 
He was the one who sought most 
control over the media.”
The Zedillo administration (1994- 
present) has been substantially more 
tolerant of Mexico’s independent
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press, bu t Mexican journalists still 
regard its policies as partial and 
contradictory at best. Among other 
incidents, Zedillo’s tenure has wit­
nessed a num ber of physical 
assaults against journalists and at 
least a few well-documented cases 
of official harassm ent (such as the 
arrest on tax evasion charges of the 
publisher of El Universal newspa­
per). Furtherm ore, fundam ental 
reform  of the legal architecture 
governing Mexico’s m edia was 
blocked by the PRI’s legislative 
majority during the first half of 
Zedillo’s adm inistration. Rather 
than prom ote m edia freedom , the 
Mexican governm ent has simply 
failed to repress an independent 
press that em erged for different 
reasons.
A second explanation for the 
changes in Mexico’s m edia is the 
im pact of economic development. 
During the 1960s and 1970s,
Mexico enjoyed steady economic 
expansion, the spread of mass edu­
cation, improvements in living stan­
dards, rapid urbanization and the 
growth of a substantial m iddle class. 
This theory holds that the process 
of m odernization created the social 
raw m aterial for independent jo u r­
nalism. In 1950, Mexico probably 
did not have the kind of dem o­
graphic profile that would have sup­
ported  a diverse and independent 
prin t media. By 1990, proponents 
of this hypothesis argue, it did.
The timing of m edia opening, 
however, provides only limited and 
conditional support for this expla­
nation. Mexicans did no t become 
richer, m ore educated or m ore lit­
erate during the 1980s and 1990s, 
and it was during this period that 
independent publications and 
broadcast programs em erged. Like 
political liberalization, economic 
developm ent may have been a nec­
essary background condition for 
m edia opening, bu t it did not lead 
automatically or immediately to 
changes in the Mexican press.
A third potential explanation for 
the rise of independen t m edia in 
Mexico is the developm ent and 
spread of new com m unication tech­
nologies. Ever since the printing 
press curtailed the power of the 
pulpit in medieval Europe, 
technophiles have emphasized the 
liberating im pact of innovation on 
mass communications. Today, 
direct broadcasting from satellites, 
the In ternet and a host o f equally 
remarkable inventions threatens to 
underm ine governm ent attem pts at 
censorship. In theory, these inno­
vations in com m unication m ight 
have allowed independen t m edia to 
em erge and flourish. Yet, while 
technological change has undoubt­
edly had a powerful effect in cer­
tain settings, it has played only a 
limited role in Mexico. The pene­
tration of advanced com m unication 
technologies remains quite small, 
according to surveys by Nielsen and 
IBOPE of Mexico. As late as 1995, 
for instance, ju st 2% of Mexican 
households had a personal com put­
er and only 10% were connected to 
a pay-television system. Moreover, 
some of the allegedly liberating 
technologies—cable television, for 
example—have long been con­
trolled by Televisa and other en ter­
prises aligned with the PRI.
Changes in the Mexican media 
were m ore likely to be the result of 
increased com petition from tradi­
tional outlets, such as broadcasting 
and prin t media.
This brings us to a fourth  possible 
explanation for increased indepen­
dence in the Mexican media: eco­
nomic liberalization and m arket 
com petition. This theory argues 
that market-friendly reform s in 
tightly controlled economies can
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underm ine government control and 
allow independent media to flourish. 
As Mexican journalist Raymundo 
Riva Palacio told Business Week in 
1993, “Economic reform in an 
authoritarian state like Mexico weak­
ens the system and opens up oppor­
tunities for other sources of power.” 
In o ther words, recent Mexican pres­
idents may not have prom oted 
media freedom directly, but they 
supported it indirectly by imple­
menting market-oriented reforms.
A substantial am ount of evidence 
supports this argum ent as it applies 
to the Mexican media. Independent 
newspapers proved they could suc­
cessfully compete for readers and 
advertisers. Their financial autono­
my in turn  gave them the ability to 
resist official pressures and blandish­
ments. In radio, the tremendous 
success of feisty talk shows in the 
early 1990s encouraged other sta­
tions hungry for advertising rev­
enues to experim ent with more inde­
pendent coverage. Finally, commer­
cial competition following the priva­
tization of government-owned televi­
sion channels in 1992-1993 put pres­
sure on the country’s dom inant net­
work, Televisa, to introduce a mea­
sure of independence in news 
reporting. The effects of commer­
cial competition were reinforced by 
economic crisis, which spurred 
Televisa to search out novel strate­
gies to protect its ratings.
We thus have the makings of a tidy 
explanation for the transformation 
of Mexico’s media. Political liberal­
ization—while partial and tenta­
tive—ruled out the sustained system­
atic assault on Mexico’s press. 
Meanwhile, changes in Mexican 
audiences brought on by economic 
development helped create a market 
for independent journalism. Finally, 
the introduction of market-oriented 
reforms rewarded independent- 
m inded media and encouraged oth­
ers to adopt new styles of coverage.
While compelling as far as it goes, 
this story is unnervingly agent-less.
It explains why independent-m inded 
journalists who experim ented with 
new styles of reporting were more 
likely to be successful in the 1980s 
and 1990s than in earlier eras. It 
also explains why their experiments 
tended to be contagious. But it does 
not explain why they were motivated 
to experim ent in the first place, nor 
why many of them persisted in doing 
so despite impressive obstacles 
(including occasional episodes of 
official repression).
The answer to this question lies in 
the development of a new journalis­
tic culture in segments of the 
Mexican press. Mexico’s emerging 
fourth estate was not simply the 
product of structural opportunities; 
it was the product of imagination, 
learning and struggle by particular 
journalists and clusters of journalists 
whose vision led them  to reject the 
old ways of doing business in favor of 
a new style of reporting. Collectively, 
they converted the opportunities 
provided by political liberalization, 
socioeconomic development and 
market-oriented reform into practi­
cal realities.
The role of journalistic profession­
alism was especially crucial for 
Mexico’s independent publications, 
including such titles as Proceso, La 
Jornada, El Financiero, Reforma, Zeta 
and Publico. Each of these periodi­
cals was created with the conscious 
goal of avoiding the traditional 
foibles of Mexican journalism, 
including corruption and collusion 
with the political establishment.
Many were founded or invigorated 
by individuals whose previous 
encounters with officialdom had 
reinforced their own self-image as 
independent journalists. W ithout 
reference to this broad process of 
professionalization, it is simply 
impossible to explain where and 
when independent media emerged.
T h e  Im p o r t a n c e  o f  A g en c y
These findings suggest that the 
emergence of a fourth estate is not
the mechanical result of political or 
economic changes. Rather, it 
depends on the efforts of a new 
cadre of journalists, their own inter­
nal process of identity formation, 
and the contagion effect they ulti­
mately have on other media. It is 
this change inside the press, as much 
as changes in the external environ­
ment, that explains media opening 
in Mexico.
Interestingly, recent studies of the 
media in other countries seem to 
point in the same direction. One 
example comes from Silvio 
Waisbord’s research on the press 
and political scandal in Argentina. 
Waisbord argues that journalists’ 
own sense of mission was a decisive 
factor in determ ining which media 
rem ained independent in the face of 
m ounting pressure from the govern­
m ent of President Carlos Menem.
Of particular importance was the 
emergence of Pagina 12 newspaper, 
whose staff retained a unique profes­
sional self-image and ideology that 
fortified the paper’s independent 
stance. Although factors like market 
competition may have encouraged 
larger media consortia to cover 
touchy stories after they broke, it was 
often Pagina 12 that made sure they 
were reported in the first place.
If these arguments are correct, 
they suggest a new approach to the 
study of press freedom. This 
approach would not deny the impor­
tance of certain background condi­
tions, including the political and 
economic realities of each country.
It would, however, focus on the moti­
vations, decisions and actions of 
journalists themselves, as well as on 
the training and experiences that 
shaped their behavior. In other 
words, it would assume that a free 
press does not appear automatically 
in the wake of political liberalization, 
economic development, technologi­
cal innovation or market-oriented 
reform. It must be built by commit­
ted journalists willing to risk censure 
or repression. ■
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Silvio Waisbord
O
n January 25, 1997, 
the charred body of 
news photographer 
Jose Luis Cabezas was 
found inside a burnt 
car in Pinamar, a 
fashionable Argentine resort town. 
The m urder sent a chill down the 
spine of Argentines, for it resembled 
the infamous methods of the death 
squads that roamed the country 
when the juntas ruled and rekindled 
memories of the “dirty war” waged by 
the last military dictatorship.
Cabezas had been kidnapped, hand­
cuffed, tortured, shot point-blank 
and set afire inside the vehicle. The 
corpse was unrecognizable; investiga­
tors used Cabezas’s car keys, watch 
and dental records to identify it.
The event became a symbol of vio­
lence against the press and a rallying 
cry for journalists in Latin America. 
Demonstrations were organized to 
petition the government to investi­
gate and prosecute the individuals 
responsible for the murder.
Cabezas’s picture and the slogan 
“Don’t Forget Cabezas” became ubiq­
uitous on billboards and signs in 
public buildings and newsrooms. 
Although almost 900 physical or ver­
bal attacks against journalists were 
recorded in Argentina between 1989 
and 1997, this case crossed the line 
of the limits of expected violence. 
The savagery of Cabezas’s execution­
ers not only was a rem inder of the 
worst years of state-sponsored vio­
lence, but also jettisoned the convic­
tion that the killing of journalists
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Violence against the press in Latin America
ended with the collapse of the 
authoritarian regime in Argentina, 
under whose rule nearly 100 journal­
ists were reported m urdered or dis­
appeared.
The Cabezas m urder is one of the 
latest examples of the persistence of 
anti-press violence in Latin America. 
The shift from authoritarianism to 
democracy has neither put an end to 
violence against journalists nor 
brought justice for its victims. Out of 
27 reporters killed worldwide in
1997, 10 were in Latin America, 
including four in Colombia, three in 
Mexico, and one each in Argentina, 
Brazil and Guatemala. During the 
last decade, scores of journalists have 
been intimidated and assaulted, and 
122 have been m urdered or "disap­
peared." Domestic and international 
organizations have mobilized to peti­
tion full investigations, and the 
Organization of American States 
(OAS) created the office of the press 
rapporteur to report abuses. Yet, the 
perpetrators of anti-press violence 
have rarely been prosecuted. As in 
the Cabezas case, judicial investiga­
tions lag and become trapped in a 
web of political interests.
What drives anti-press violence in 
Latin America, and what does it say 
about the current state of freedom 
of expression in the region? Is the 
problem related to the difficulty of 
guaranteeing respect for human 
rights? O r is it a manifestation of 
larger dynamics of political violence 
that underlie the region’s political 
history?
A n t i-P r ess V io l e n c e  a n d  P o litica l  
V io l e n c e
Anti-press violence is, arguably, 
merely another manifestation of the 
widespread violence that has long
plagued Latin America. In a region 
dominated by violent politics, it 
would be surprising if the press were 
not a target of attacks. It is no coin­
cidence, then, that there have been 
more lethal attacks againstjournal- 
ists in countries where historical lev­
els of violence continue unabated. 
According to the records of interna­
tional and domestic organizations, 
the situation in Colombia, 
Guatemala, Mexico and Peru is sig­
nificantly worse than anywhere else 
in the region. A death toll of 153 
journalists between 1978 and 1997 
has made Colombia in particular 
one of the most dangerous countries 
for journalists in the world, although 
the situation has improved somewhat 
in the 1990s: 18 journalists were 
killed in 1986 during the heyday of 
the Medellin cartel-related violence, 
compared to five in 1997. Also in 
the 1990s, 15 murders of journalists 
have been docum ented in Mexico 
and 20 in Peru.
In these countries, anti-press vio­
lence does not seem to be isolated 
from broader political conditions. 
Violence has characterized 
Colombian politics for much of the 
country’s m odern history.
Guatemala, too, is still reeling in the 
aftermath of 56 years of civil war. In 
Mexico, drug-related violence has 
become commonplace, especially in 
the northern  states. Peru is grap­
pling with the remnants of violent 
guerrilla movements and the legacy 
of the 1992 coup, which gave carte 
blanche to military and intelligence 
services.
Anti-press violence is linked to the 
crisis of the state; that is, the inability 
to monopolize the legitimate means 
of violence and m onitor respect for 
the rule of law. The existence of
areas subjected to the rule of drug 
barons, paramilitary squads and 
guerrilla movements attests to the 
breakdown of state authority. 
Although any generalization would 
miss the nuances of each case, 
attacks against journalists need to be 
understood as an expression of a sit­
uation of "uncivil" war: localized, dis­
persed and unstructured violence 
that lacks the characteristics of for­
mal civil wars. This type of crisis 
varies across and within countries, 
but it is glaringly evident in countries 
where anti-press violence is recur­
rent.
The weight of the drug economy 
has exacerbated the situation. Often 
in complicity with local and national 
authorities, druglords hold absolute 
control over determ ined geographi­
cal zones in Latin America. Any 
journalist reporting on drug issues 
faces not only the prospect of anger­
ing narcotraficantes with no patience 
for democratic debate, but also the 
passivity of official authorities. The 
problem is complicated further by 
the military and paramilitary squads 
created to combat drug trafficking 
or guerrilla insurrection. Such 
groups enjoy a great deal of autono­
my and, if accountable at all, answer 
only to military authorities. The 
combination of powerful druglords 
and corrupt official forces, especially 
in regions dom inated by guerrilla 
movements in the last decade, has 
been lethal for journalists. A com­
plex web of interests, including 
druglords, local bosses, police, mili­
tary forces and guerrillas, is con­
firmed or suspected behind dozens 
of attacks against reporters.
These problems characterize the 
interior of countries especially. 
Although urban areas are certainly
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not exempt, the provincial press has 
been more prone to fatal attacks 
than the metropolitan press in Latin 
America. In the last decade, 75% of 
the murders and disappearances of 
journalists in the region occurred in 
provincial areas. Between 1986 and 
1996, one out of a total of 10 jou r­
nalists killed in Mexico was m ur­
dered in the country’s capital. 
Similarly, journalists reporting for 
news organizations in Brasilia, Rio de 
Janeiro and Sao Paulo have rarely 
been the targets of violence; most 
attacks have been directed against 
their colleagues in the Brazilian inte­
rior. In Paraguay, too, journalists 
working in border towns have suf­
fered more intimidation and physical 
attacks than their counterparts in 
Asuncion.
When the state fails to exercise full 
sovereignty and the rule of law is 
weak, journalists, like other citizens, 
confront a dangerous situation. 
Unlike regular citizens, however, 
journalists—especially those affiliat­
ed with major news organizations in 
metropolitan areas—are in a posi­
tion to attract wide publicity. Large 
media organizations as well as 
national and international organiza­
tions offer "deterrence by publicity," 
although this does not guarantee 
invulnerability—the frequent harass­
m ent of journalists in metropolitan 
areas, including assassinations in 
broad daylight, is evidence enough. 
Journalists removed from the lime­
light of the big media are even less 
protected. Lacking the visibility and 
prom inence of metropolitan news 
media or effective checks on local 
powers, regional reporters are vul­
nerable to police brutality or para­
military repression.
The ineffectiveness of the judicial 
system exacerbates the situation of 
lawlessness in much of Latin 
America. Perpetrators are rarely cap­
tured, and when they are, cases are 
often shelved and forgotten; for 
example, perpetrators were identi­
fied and apprehended in only six out
of 108 murders of Colombian jo u r­
nalists between 1977 and 1995. The 
problem is not so much an absence 
of legislation, but a lack of enforce­
ment. This shortcoming is not 
unique to violence against the press; 
it represents the larger difficulties of 
institutionalizing the rule of law and 
eliminating impunity in the region.
V io l e n c e  a n d  a  N ew  J o u r n a l ist ic  
Spir it
Anti-press violence is not indis­
criminate. It is not "the press" as a 
whole that suffers violence, but indi­
vidual reporters and news organiza­
tions. In the past, harassment of 
reporters was linked to partisan and 
ideological confrontations. Today’s 
attacks show a different pattern, 
reflecting the rise of news organiza­
tions that dare to take jabs at govern­
m ent officials and examine the activi­
ties of paramilitary organizations and 
drug-trafficking organizations. The 
majority of the victims are reporters 
who cover controversial and sensitive 
issues, such as corruption, narcotics 
trafficking and hum an rights abuses. 
In Mexico, the targets include publi­
cations that investigate the linkages 
between drug barons and local 
police and judges, such as Tijuana- 
based Zeta. Reporters who write 
about police corruption, including 
journalists from TV Azteca, Reforma 
and El Universal, are also attacked.
In Peru, the newsweekly Caretas and 
the daily La Republica, as well as print 
and broadcast investigative reporters, 
are intimidated by military and intel­
ligence services. In an episode that 
had national and international 
repercussions, the staff and owner of 
the television station Frecuencia 
Latina had to leave the country in 
the aftermath of reports that 
denounced military abuses, corrup­
tion and illegal government wiretap­
ping.
In countries that lack a legacy of 
respect for basic democratic rights, 
the belief persists among some pow­
erful actors that critical reporting is a
nuisance that can and must be elimi­
nated. Despite the evident improve­
m ent of general press freedoms since 
the return of democratic rule to 
Latin America, the ambiguous atti­
tude of governments in the region 
toward the press implicitly sends the 
message that violence against jou r­
nalists will not be punished. Legal 
attempts to muffle press criticism 
reinforce the sense that an adversari­
al press cannot be tolerated.
In Argentina, the government’s 
tirades against journalists run 
counter to the official rhetoric that a 
critical press is a welcome develop­
m ent for a democratic order. When 
a reporter investigating connections 
between political mafias and promi­
nent politicians was beaten recently, 
President Carlos Saul Menem matter- 
of-factly observed that such attacks 
were "occupational hazards." After 
an expose about the construction of 
a new airport runway in his home­
town, Menem lashed back, stating 
that the report was produced by "stu­
pid, lying and despicable [journal­
ists] paid by the opposition." During 
a press briefing for foreign corre­
spondents in June 1997, he 
described Horacio Verbitsky, an 
influential columnist for the daily 
Pagina/12, as “one of the biggest ter­
rorists in Argentina.” Later the same 
year, Menem endorsed the ley del 
polo, paraphrasing Benjamin 
Franklin on making “the liberty of 
the cudgel” a condition of freedom 
of the press. Franklin joked that this 
law would make it permissible for 
writers who attacked individual repu­
tations to be waylaid and beaten, and 
for reporters who affronted the pub­
lic to be tarred and feathered. The 
ironic tone of Franklin’s comments 
did not translate well in a country 
still reeling from the brutal assassina­
tion of Cabezas. Finally, in the after- 
math of press revelations about gov­
ernm ent corruption, the Menem 
administration submitted a proposal 
to Congress that included prison sen­
tences and hefty fines for “insults”
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and libel. The recom m ended pun­
ishments were harsher than those 
prescribed for torture. Menem 
rescinded the “gag law” proposal 
only after domestic and internation­
al observers protested.
Elsewhere in Latin America, the 
legal situation is not much better. 
The Peruvian press continues to be 
subjected to antiterrorist laws enact­
ed after the 1992 coup. In Mexico, 
the Zedillo administration presented 
an official proposal to Congress that 
included fines of up to $100,000 for 
defamation and unlimited amounts 
in damages against media owners. 
Seventy-four cases have been filed so 
far.
W h y  D o e s  A n t i-P r ess  V io l e n c e  
M a tter?
A democratic press is contingent 
on the strengthening of civil society 
and the observance of fundamental 
constitutional liberties. In Latin 
America, the difficulty is not only 
the establishment of a press 
autonomous from the state but also 
the existence of societies decimated 
by uncivil, violent practices. Anti­
press violence magnifies the fragility 
of democratic institutions in coun­
tries still experiencing internal wars 
and whose governments are inca­
pable of protecting basic rights.
Latin America bears a legacy of vio­
lence inherited from dictatorial peri­
ods. The region continues to suffer 
from the discretionary use of state 
force and criminal organizations 
that escape any means of democratic 
control. The equivocal attitude of 
elected officials toward the protec­
tion of press rights contributes fur­
ther to create an atmosphere of vio­
lence. Prospects for affirming a 
democratic press are seriously con­
strained when civil society, ideally a 
realm of pluralism and tolerance of 
dissent, is shredded into islands of 
civility. Beyond those islands the 
press, if critical of local and national 
powers, faces the violence of decid­
edly uncivil wars. ■
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Gone to Rust
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S
ince Bolivia first entered 
the global economy during 
the period of Spanish colo­
nial rule, its role has been 
that of mineral exporter. 
The legendary mines of 
Potosf and other rich silver veins in 
Alto Peru, as Bolivia was then known, 
financed the Spanish empire 
throughout much of the colonial 
period. In the twentieth century, 
Bolivia’s mines again pulled the 
country into the world economy, this 
time with exports of tin. Bolivia 
became the world’s leading tin pro­
ducer, feeding industrial demand for 
canning and other uses.
Eventually, however, the tin mines 
were depleted or rendered obsolete 
by new metal alloys and synthetic 
materials. By 1980, Bolivia’s export 
commodities had diversified to 
include natural gas and agricultural 
products, with tin representing only 
about one-quarter of the value of 
total exports. The price of tin was 
$5.72 per pound in 1978; by 1985, it 
had fallen by more than half, to 
$2.50. Miners who already suffered 
notorious working conditions and 
poor health clung to the jobs that 
were the only source of their survival.
In 1985, President Victor Paz 
Estenssoro, who had nationalized the 
country’s mines after the 1952 
Bolivian Revolution, enacted a 
decree that shut many of them down. 
Instead of acknowledging the dis­
missals, the government claimed that 
workers were merely being “relocat-
Patricio Crooker is a photojournalist 
based in Bolivia. Some of the following 
images appeared in the Bolivian newspa­
per La Razon in June 1999 as part of a 
special feature on former mining towns.
ed” to more productive sectors.
More than 20,000 miners lost their 
jobs, and once-thriving mining cen­
ters became ghost towns. Tent cities 
sprang up on the outskirts of La Paz 
and Cochabamba as unemployed 
miners migrated to urban centers in 
search of work.
Today, the mines and the towns 
built around them languish in desola­
tion. Theaters that once premiered 
new shows are boarded up. Carts 
that carried ore out of the mines rust 
in their tracks. Incongruous rem­
nants of the good life, like the golf 
club in the deserted mining town of 
Catavi, are painful reminders that the 
wealth of the past is the poverty of 
the present.
Little by little, some of the former 
mining towns have begun to revive. 
Taking advantage of good transporta­
tion routes, necessary at one time to 
get the minerals to market, the city of 
Oruro has reinvented itself as a thriv­
ing center of contraband. In 
Llallagua, former miners have
become taxi drivers, bricklayers and 
locksmiths. Young people fill the 
main plaza, and four separate bus 
companies serve neighboring cities.
A university and television station are 
proof that the town is beginning to 
recover culturally and psychologically, 
as well. In other areas, zinc and ore 
have replaced silver and tin as prof­
itable minerals to mine. Many former 
mining centers, however—Corocoro 
and Catavi among them—appear to 
be slipping irretrievably into oblivion.
In her 1979 study of workers in 
Bolivia’s tin mines, We Eat the Mines 
and the Mines Eat Us, anthropologist 
June Nash quoted one m iner as say­
ing to another, ‘You are like a piece 
of ore; you are a part of the mine.” 
This statement reflects the degree to 
which the lives of Bolivia’s miners 
were linked to the mines they 
worked, and the trauma posed by 
“relocation.” At the same time, it 
captures the miners’ resiliency and 
ability to endure seemingly unending 
hardship. ■
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The decline of Bolivia’s mining towns
A miner pushes a cart at the opening of the Siglo XX mine. Some miners continue to hang on, working under 
extremely poor conditions to salvage leftover minerals.
Opposite: Siglo XX, near the town of Llallagua in the northern part of Potosi, is one of the oldest mines in 
Bolivia. This photo shows what used to be an important facility in a state of near collapse. After the gov- 
emment of Victor Paz Estenssoro issued decree 21060 in 1985, thousands of miners lost their jobs and moved 
to the cities in search of work.
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m o d i
A building serving as headquarters for a cooperativa, or labor cooperative. After the economic reforms of 
the mid 1980s, many miners who lost their jobs organized into such cooperatives to work the mines'leavings. 
Many work 12 hours a day, squeezing what they can from the rubble. Lacking in technology and capital, 
they resort to grinding the rocks by hand.
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The hands of this palliri— a worker who tries to salvage the last bits of mineral from rocks extracted from the 
mine— reflect the long hours she has toiled for meager reward. This picture was taken near the river in the 
town ofHuanuni, once an important mine oumed by tin baron Simon I. Patino. Now it is oumed by Comibol, 
the state mining company, and employs only 300 mitiers. This woman and others like her earn approximately 
$4 for a 12-hour day.
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This miner, in charge of draining water from the mine, is one of the 300 workers who kept their jobs in 
Huanuni. Without proper drainage, the tunnels could flood, trapping the miners inside.
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Two kilometers in and 200 meters down, breathing becomes difficult. A miner fortifies himself against the 
darkness with coca leaves and a cigarette.
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Two Bolivian soldiers nod off during their 12-hour shift inside the Huanuni mine. Comibol pays the Army to 
guard the remaining minerals from pilferers. The soldiers share the same miserable working conditions as the 
miners themselves.
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An elderly woman walks down the mam street o f Com com, Bolivia’s most important copper mine at the begin­
ning of the century. Today the mayor’s pickup truck and one military vehicle are the only cars on the town’s 
empty streets. Comcom’s young people leave for the cities as soon as they can; only the elderly stay behind. 
Many homes that were boarded up during the mining exodus of the mid-1980s remain abandoned.
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Statues honoring miners in Llallagua. The statue on the left represents Federico Escobar Zapata, who died 
fighting for a better life fo r miners. The one on the right is dedicated to all those who gave their lives in the 
mines.
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The abandoned dub house of the Catavi Golf Club near Llallagua in northern Potosi. During the mining 
boom years, the mining towns were the center of Bolivia’s economic and cultural life. New plays and films 
premiered there, and the best soccer teams visited for tournaments. The Catavi golf course is now a wheat 
field.
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The Teatro 31 de Octubre in Llallagua used to be one of the first stops on the touring schedules of new plays. 
The town no longer has enough people to keep it open, and the theater’s fagade has fallen into disrepair. 
C atavi’s theater has met the same fate.
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A dilapidated Comibol station wagon parked in front o f an abandoned building in the mining town of Catavi. 
The scene captures the desolation of most mining towns in Bolivia today.
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Desperate Measures, Layered Truths
Kathleen M artin
A
utobiographical 
accounts such as 
Rigoberta M enchu’s 
Crossing Borders have a 
wide readership, 
whether because of 
the fame of the subject, the com­
pelling nature of the story or the 
eloquence with which the protago­
nist’s account is told. The very best 
autobiographical literature, of 
course, embodies all of these ele­
ments. Rigoberta M enchu’s first 
book, I,...Rigoberta Menchu, written 
before the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize 
winner became an internationally 
known figure, achieved its fame 
based on its stunning first-person 
account of the poverty, violence and 
racism experienced by the indige­
nous peoples of Guatemala. Her 
second book is unlikely to stir the 
controversy generated by her first 
and is, unfortunately, disappointing. 
Crossing Borders is no t a compelling 
story, nor is it compellingly told. 
Only the fact that a Nobel laureate 
is telling it provokes interest.
Crossing Borders, published in
1998, is a continuance of Rigoberta 
M enchu’s life story, covering the 15 
years intervening since I ,... Rigoberta 
Menchu was first published in 1983. 
During this period, the author went 
into exile in Mexico and reached 
the high point of her career as an 
activist by winning the Nobel Peace 
Prize. She got m arried and adopted
Kathleen R  Martin is a professor in the 
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about the Yucatec Maya poet and politi­
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Rigoberta Menchu and the Story of 
All Poor Guatemalans
by David Stoll
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999. 
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a child. Political harassment contin­
ued to plague her, reaching into her 
innerm ost family life. Yet, despite 
these significant events, Crossing 
Borders has none of the immediacy 
of I,...Rigoberta Menchu. It fails to 
provide the sort of personal reflec­
tion that would allow readers to 
understand the thinking of this cen­
tury’s most im portant indigenous 
leader.
M enchu writes straightforwardly, 
but without the depth one would 
expect from someone with her 
accomplishments and life experi­
ences. She is most insightful when 
describing the complexities of fame, 
but less so when discussing other, 
more abstract issues. For example, 
the concept of “crossing borders”—
moving across cultural, political and 
national frontiers—promises to be a 
useful framework for M enchu’s dis­
cussion of her life as an internation­
al activist. Yet, in Crossing Borders 
the concept seems to be taken quite 
literally, as the au thor describes sev­
eral incidents in which she experi­
enced difficulties crossing interna­
tional boundaries. In these pas­
sages, as in others, M enchu presents 
herself as a victim—an inappropri­
ate stance for someone of her inter­
national stature and political im por­
tance.
Crossing Borders is a potentially sig­
nificant book, because it gives the 
author a chance to tell her story 
directly. In contrast, I,...Rigoberta 
Menchu was an “as-told-to” testimoni­
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al in which Venezuelan anthropolo­
gist Elizabeth Burgos interviewed 
M enchu and edited the resulting 
text. Crossing Borders may be m ore 
authentic, but it is not necessarily a 
more analytical, accessible or con­
textually richer account. While the 
au thor’s own limitations as a self- 
reflective writer restrict the book’s 
usefulness, the life story of the 
world’s leading spokeswoman for 
indigenous peoples deserves a 
much more careful presentation 
than it gets here. Perhaps 
M enchu’s advisors, and certainly 
her editors, are at fault for doing 
her a disservice in the production of 
this book.
Crossing Borders was first published 
in Spanish as Rigoberta: La nieta de 
los may as. The English and the 
Spanish versions are quite different; 
the latter is m ore than 100 pages 
longer, and is undeniably better. 
Absent from Crossing Borders are 
prefaces by the Uruguayan writer 
Eduardo Galeano (who recently 
won the Lannan Foundation’s 
Cultural Freedom Award) and the 
head of the Spanish section of 
Amnesty International, Esteban 
Beltran. Also om itted are a pro­
logue by Italian writer Gianni Mina 
and an especially lyrical introduc­
tion by Maya Quiche poet 
Hum berto Ak’abal. The essays by 
these writers provide a rich context 
for M enchu’s story. The Spanish 
version includes the au tho r’s own 
acknowledgments and the text of 
the Guatemalan peace accords— 
both im portant in understanding 
her story—as well as 16 pages of 
photographs that visually enrich the 
text. A random  line-by-line compar­
ison between the two versions 
revealed o ther sections that appear
in the Spanish edition but not in 
the English one. The Spanish ver­
sion gives proper credit to Dante 
Liano and Gianni Mina for their 
assistance in producing the book, 
while the English version does not. 
Crossing Borders, however, contains a 
glossary, an index, a not very useful 
map and a list of M enchu’s family 
not present in the Spanish edition.
Crossing Borders could have used 
some careful editing to make it 
more accessible to readers or simply 
to improve the text. Since the book 
was intended to chronicle M enchu’s 
life over the past 15 years, present­
ing her story in chronological order 
would seem to be an obvious deci­
sion. Unfortunately, the account 
skips back and forth through time, 
making it difficult for anyone unfa­
miliar with M enchu’s history to 
keep track of events.
Thoughtful editing could have 
improved Crossing Borders in other 
ways as well. A sensitive editor 
could perhaps have persuaded the 
author to delete some of her more 
peevish comments, unworthy of a 
Nobel laureate. M enchu is prone to 
blame others for failings that she 
herself shares. She criticizes the 
personal appearance of groups and 
individuals—Latinas, fellow 
Guatemalans, even some of her 
Native American supporters—yet 
bristles at comments about her own 
looks. Likewise, she condemns fel­
low Guatemalans for leaving their 
country to mobilize from abroad, 
although she herself spent years liv­
ing in exile in Mexico. M enchu also 
takes anthropologists to task for 
their parasitic relationship with 
indigenous peoples, but ignores 
examples of anthropologists who act 
on behalf of the communities they
study—to take but one example, 
Myrna Mack Chang, who was 
stabbed to death because of her 
reports about the state-sponsored 
violence in Guatemala.
The editors of Crossing Borders 
have produced a substandard 
account of M enchu’s story and 
should be held answerable for their 
omissions and inattentive editing. 
Those interested in the Nobel laure­
ate’s story would do better to read 
the Spanish-language original.
Despite the flaws of Crossing 
Borders, it is M enchu’s first book that 
lies at the center of the current con­
troversy surrounding her. This con­
troversy erupted as the result of the
1999 book Rigoberta Menchu and the 
Story of AU Poor Guatemalans, by 
N orth American anthropologist 
David Stoll. Through long and 
careful research, Stoll refutes signifi­
cant portions of the Nobel laure­
ate’s story as reported  in
I,...Rigoberta Menchu. The resulting 
uproar has stirred debate in the 
press, especially in Guatemala and 
the U nited States.
Fifteen years ago a young (23-year- 
old) , politically committed 
Rigoberta M enchu told an allegedly 
first-person account of her suffer­
ings as an indigenous woman in an 
oppressive Guatemalan society. 
Elizabeth Burgos, the anthropolo­
gist who recorded M enchu’s story, 
originally in tended it as a magazine 
article; she later decided that she 
had enough material for a book. 
First published in Spanish,
/,.. .Rigoberta Menchu went on to 
become an international bestseller.
It has been translated into a dozen 
languages and added to required 
reading lists in many universities. It 
is unlikely that anyone involved in
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the first interview with M enchu 
thought that either she or the book 
would go on to achieve such fame, 
or that at some later time the accu­
racy of her account would be sub­
jec t to the close scrutiny it has 
received. The goal of recording her 
story was to draw public attention to 
the genocidal war being waged 
against the indigenous peoples of 
Guatemala.
Stoll suggests that this explains 
why M enchu’s account neglects to 
m ention aspects of the Guatemalan 
reality, such as intra-Maya land own­
ership disputes, that would cloud 
the construct of the Guatemalan 
tragedy as an indigenous versus ladi- 
no conflict. He also discovered that 
some of the book’s wrenching eye­
witness testimony was not in fact 
part of M enchu’s personal experi­
ence. As one Guatemalan 
expressed it, “The book may no t be 
true about her, but it is true about 
Guatemala.” In sum, the hum an 
rights agenda in Guatemala called 
for desperate measures and ended 
with layered truths.
Stoll did not start out with the 
idea of writing a book to refute 
M enchu’s story. But in the process 
of interviewing survivors of the 
political violence in Guatemala in 
the late 1980s, he began to hear 
accounts that differed, in some 
instances greatly, from M enchu’s 
original narrative. This led him to 
conduct detailed, fact-checking 
research into M enchu’s life story. 
The result is a carefully crafted 
piece of scholarly investigative work, 
clearly written and accessible to 
readers. The bulk of the book is in 
the form of a counternarrative to 
M enchu’s account in I ,.. .Rigoberta 
Menchu. Yet, this is not Stoll’s most 
significant contribution. The most 
interesting part of his book is the 
final four chapters, in which he 
interprets the m eaning of Rigoberta 
M enchu as an iconic figure.
Stoll maintains that through the 
construction of her narrative in
I,...Rigoberta Menchu, the author 
became a symbol used to prolong a 
guerrilla war that the Guatemalan 
left was losing and which from the 
start had found questionable sup­
port am ong the indigenous peas­
antry. Furtherm ore, he makes the 
case that the North American and 
European scholarly and hum an 
rights communities used M enchu’s 
account of her life to idealize 
indigenous peoples, ultimately to 
serve their own moral needs. 
Uncritical acceptance of her narra­
tive was virtually required as proof 
of one’s com m itm ent to the 
oppressed and, for scholars especial­
ly, to ease the troubling nature of 
working as observers of the lives of 
the poor. For such readers, the dis­
course of unequal power relations 
was enough to excuse accounts such 
as M enchu’s from the need for any 
sort of validation.
The elaboration of these themes 
is the lasting, thought-provoking 
contribution of Stoll’s book. Some 
of his ideas remain undeveloped, 
but his provocative account has 
spurred debate on several issues, in 
particular the construction of
indigenous identities in the service 
of intellectual and activist communi­
ties. Stoll’s work is proof that when 
scholars go against the accepted wis­
dom (or political correctness) of 
the day, they may inadvertently 
reconstruct the paths of intellectual 
inquiry.
The sad consequence of the con­
troversy surrounding Rigoberta 
M enchu is that she and the cause of 
the indigenous peoples she repre­
sents have been tainted in the pub­
lic eye and perhaps lost credibility. 
An uninform ed reading of Stoll’s 
book could lead to the simplistic 
conclusion that M enchu was delib­
erately un truthful in telling her life 
story, albeit in the service of a des­
perately immediate hum an rights 
cause. Hers appears to be a case of 
the ends justifying the means—a 
morally debatable proposition for 
most readers.
Stoll has thoroughly checked 
every aspect of M enchu’s story.
One can only hope that those 
responsible for the genocide of 
Guatemala’s indigenous peoples will 
be held to the same exacting stan­
dard of accountability. ■
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opportunity to engage in an exciting dialogue and exchange with 
artists and scholars of these culturally rich areas of the world. The
2000 Summer Institute unites local, national, and international 
scholars, artists, students, and educators in a celebration of the 
dance, music, and culture of the culturally diverse city of Miami, 
helping to preserve and prom ote these distinctive traditions. This 
year’s program will feature Chuck Davis and the African American 
Dance Ensemble and Raimundo “Mestre King” Santos from 
Salvador, Brazil. Highlights of the Summer Dance Institute include 
technique classes in Haitian, Afro-Cuban, Afro-Brazilian, capoeira, 
Caribbean, and West African dance and drum m ing with renowned 
teachers and artists; interdisciplinary, team-taught academic inten- 
sives in “Dance and Culture of Africa and the Diaspora” and 
“Cultural Expressions of Latin America and the Caribbean;” panel 
discussions with distinguished scholars in the field; a pre-perfor­
mance processional and libation ceremony down Miami Beach’s 
famous Lincoln Road and a concert at the Colony Theater by 
Chuck Davis and the African American Dance Ensemble; and an 
informal dance and drum m ing jam  with Institute master teachers 
and musicians.
June 25 - July 1, 2000 
N ew  World School o f the Arts 
M iami, Florida
The Summer Dance Institute 
is co-sponsored by FIU’s 
Department of Theatre and 
Dance, African/New World 
Studies Program and 
Latin American and 
Caribbean Center
For further information
For detailed information regard­
ing college and in-service credit, 
or more information on INDAMI 
and other FIU programs, 
please contact:
INDAMI Program Coordinator 
Florida International University 
University Park, DM 353 
Miami, Florida 33199 
Tel: 305-348-2894 
Fax: 305-348-3593 
E-mail: indami@fiu.edu
Florida Dance Festival 
505 17th Street 
Miami Beach, Florida 33139 
Tel: 305-674-3350 
Fax: 305-674-3354 
E-mail: fldance@fldance. org
t h e  m o s t  f r e q u e n t l y  s p o t t e d  
B I R D  T H R O U G H O U T  L A T I N  A M E R I C A .
£ —r No other airline in the world offers more travel options to Latin America than we do. Now with 
I? J t
over 100 flights every business day to 33 cities in 18 countries throughout Mexico, Central and
South America. From six major U.S. cities. As always, ^A dvan tage® travel aw ards program  
members can earn mileage credit every tim e they fly . So whether y o u ’re flying to Latin America fo r  business 
or pleasure, f ly  the airline that’s leading the way. For details, call your Travel Agent or American at 1-800-433-7300 
or visit us on the web at www.aa.com Consulte a su agente de viajes
o llam e gratis a Am erican Airlines al 1-800-633-3711 en espanol. Something special to Latin Am erica’
A R G E N T I N A  • B E L I Z E  • B O L I V I A  • B R A Z I L  • C H I L E  • C O L O M B I A  • C O S T A  R I C A  • E C U A D O R  • EL  S A L V A D O R
G U A T E M A L A  • H O N D U R A S  • M E X I C O  • N I C A R A G U A  • P A N A M A  • P A R A G U A Y  • P E R U  • U R U G U A Y  .  V E N E Z U E L A
American Airlines and AAdvantage are registered trademarks o f American Airlines, Inc. American Airlines reserves the right to change AAdvantage program rules, regulations, travel awards 
and special offers at any time without notice, and to end the AAdvantage program with six months notice. AAdvantage travel awards, mileage accrual and special offers are subject 
to government regulations. American Airlines is not responsible fo r  products or services offered by other participating companies. Schedules subject to change without notice.
